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When markets are imperfectly competitive, trade policies can alter the terms of trade, shift profits
from one country to another, and moderate or exacerbate existing distortions that are associated with
the presence of monopoly power. In light of the various ways in which trade policies may influence
welfare, it might be expected that new rationales for trade agreements would arise once imperfectly
competitive markets are allowed. In this paper, we consider several trade models that feature imperfectly
competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is, in fact, the same rationale
that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In all of the models that we consider, and whether or not
governments have political-economic objectives, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy
the inefficient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume. Having identified the problem that
a trade agreement might solve, we next evaluate the form that an efficiency-enhancing trade agreement
might take. Here, too, our results parallel the results established previously for models with perfectly
competitive markets. In particular, we show that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination
(MFN) are efficiency enhancing, as they serve to "undo" the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade
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Governments have a reason to form a trade agreement when an international externality is asso-
ciated with their trade-policy choices. When countries are large, if a government raises its import
tari⁄, then the world (o⁄shore) price of the imported good is reduced. The importing country then
enjoys an improvement in its terms of trade, and the exporting country su⁄ers a negative terms-
of-trade externality. As Johnson (1954) argues, when governments maximize national welfare and
markets are perfectly competitive, the associated non-cooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient, and
governments can achieve greater welfare by forming an appropriately designed trade agreement.
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) extend the modeling framework to
allow that governments have political-economic preferences. Allowing for a wide range of possible
political-economic motivations, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that the non-cooperative equilib-
rium is ine¢ cient if and only if governments are motivated by the terms-of-trade consequences of
their respective trade policies. Building from this ￿nding, they then characterize the form that an
e¢ ciency-enhancing trade agreement might take. They show that the principles of reciprocity and
non-discrimination (MFN) play a useful role in guiding governments toward e¢ cient policies.
In this paper, we move beyond the competitive-markets paradigm and expand the analysis to
markets with imperfect competition, thereby introducing the realistic possibility that ￿rms have
market power. A ￿rm with market power is itself ￿large,￿ in the sense that it does not regard
the market price as ￿xed; instead, such a ￿rm recognizes that its decisions may in￿ uence the price
at which its output sells. The terms-of-trade externality is still present in markets with imperfect
competition, but the well-known ￿pro￿t-shifting￿role for trade policies in imperfectly competitive
markets suggests that other international externalities might also be present. For a sequence of
models with imperfectly competitive markets, we examine the rationale for a trade agreement, and
we also consider the form that an e¢ ciency-enhancing trade agreement might take.
When markets are imperfectly competitive, a government may be tempted to use trade policy
as a means of extracting pro￿t from foreign exporters. This temptation arises as well, at least in
the short run, when markets are perfectly competitive; however, the consideration of imperfectly
competitive markets introduces several novel features. First, an understanding of the impact of
trade policy on the world price now requires a theory as to how price is determined when ￿rms
possess market power. Second, when domestic ￿rms also participate in the oligopolistic market,
trade policy may have strategic e⁄ects in so far as it alters the oligopolistic interaction between
domestic and foreign ￿rms. While trade policy can again shift foreign pro￿ts to the domestic
treasury in the form of tari⁄ revenue, it may now also shift some foreign pro￿t to domestic ￿rms.
Third, when markets are imperfectly competitive, output levels are often distorted away from
nationally or globally e¢ cient levels. In the absence of domestic policies that directly target such
distortions, trade policies may serve as second-best policies that diminish existing distortions.
These and other motives for trade policy intervention are represented in an expansive litera-
ture that examines optimal unilateral trade policy under imperfect competition. One of the main
conclusions of this literature is that optimal unilateral trade policy is highly sensitive to market
1structure.1 Based on the ￿ndings of this literature, it might be expected that the rationale for a
trade agreement would likewise vary markedly with market structure. Consistent with this expec-
tation, we show that new international externalities indeed arise when market power is present:
in addition to the terms-of-trade externality that travels through the world price, there are also
local-price externalities that travel through domestic and foreign local prices. These local-price
externalities are associated with the oligopolistic pro￿t-shifting and distortion-in￿ uencing a⁄ects
of trade policies. For our purposes, however, the key question is whether governments internal-
ize these international externalities in an appropriate fashion from a world-wide perspective when
they make their unilateral policy choices. For a sequence of models that feature imperfectly com-
petitive market structures, we address this question and establish a surprising answer: the basic
rationale for a trade agreement is, in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive
markets. In particular, in all of the models that we consider, and whether or not governments have
political-economic objectives, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient
terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume. Furthermore, and again as in the benchmark
model with perfect competition, the principles of reciprocity and MFN are e¢ ciency enhancing,
as they serve to ￿undo￿ the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume that occur when
governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
To establish these points, we consider the distinct motives for trade policy intervention that
arise when there is a monopoly supplier in one country2 (Section 2), when there is oligopolistic
interaction between an exporting and an import-competing ￿rm3 (Section 3), and when there is
oligopolistic interaction between two ￿rms exporting from two di⁄erent countries to a third-country
market4 (Section 4). In each setting, our approach is to examine the non-cooperative and e¢ cient
policy choices in detail and evaluate the precise reasons for any divergence between them. To
this end, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and evaluate politically optimal tari⁄s, de￿ned as
those tari⁄s that would hypothetically be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value
the pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their
unilateral tari⁄ choices. For each setting, we show that politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient, and
we thereby establish that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient terms-
of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume. With this rationale for a trade agreement in hand, we
then proceed to establish that the principles of reciprocity and (in the third-country setting) MFN
are e¢ ciency enhancing in each setting as well.
1For excellent summaries of the early literature on optimal trade policy under imperfect competition, see Brander
(1995) and Helpman and Krugman (1989).
2Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984a) consider the role of import tari⁄s as a means of extracting pro￿ts from
non-competitive foreign suppliers.
3In a setting with international oligopoly competition, trade policy may play a ￿strategic￿ role by altering the
nature of oligopolistic competition, as the seminal papers of Spencer and Brander (1983) and Brander and Spencer
(1985) have shown. These papers assume that international markets are integrated; Brander and Spencer (1984b)
and Dixit (1984) explore related models with segmented markets.
4International oligopoly competition now occurs between exporters from di⁄erent countries. As Brander and
Spencer (1985) show, due to the pro￿t-shifting e⁄ect of an export subsidy, the optimal unilateral export policy for a
government in such a setting may be an export subsidy.
2If the presence of imperfectly competitive ￿rms introduces new international externalities that
are transmitted through non-terms-of-trade channels, as we con￿rm below, then how is it that the
problem for a trade agreement to solve in this more complicated environment still boils down to
providing an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma? Broadly speaking,
the reason is that trade agreements do not expand the set of feasible policy instruments available to
governments, and so any e¢ ciency gains generated by a trade agreement must derive from changes
in the level of intervention achieved with the existing policy instruments; and as we demonstrate
below, even in this more complicated environment it is the international rent-shifting/cost-shifting
associated with the terms-of-trade externality ￿and this externality alone ￿that accounts for the
ine¢ cient level of intervention under unilateral policy choices.
The analysis in this paper maintains the assumption that the number of producers in each
country is ￿xed and invariant to trade policy. This gives rise to the existence of pro￿table ￿rms in
the models we have described above, and it is the pursuit of those pro￿ts ￿either converted into
tari⁄ revenue as in the monopoly exporter model of Section 2, or shifted from one ￿rm to another
as in the duopoly pro￿t-shifting models of Sections 3 and 4 ￿combined with the relaxation of the
assumption of price-taking behavior that provides the novel role for government tari⁄intervention in
these models. An alternative role for government intervention can arise when free-entry conditions
serve to eliminate pro￿ts in equilibrium even though ￿rms are not price-takers. This alternative
centers on a ￿rm ￿delocation￿e⁄ect of trade policy intervention that could enhance the welfare
of the intervening country: by triggering foreign exit and domestic entry, a domestic import tari⁄
can lead to greater competition in the domestic market and therefore lower prices for domestic
consumers (Venables, 1985, 1987, Helpman and Krugman, 1989, Ossa 2008). In a companion
paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 2009), we consider this alternative by exploring models in which ￿rms
are not price takers but where entry is endogenous, and we again ask whether a novel role for trade
agreements can be identi￿ed. For the models of ￿rm delocation, our main ￿nding is again that the
terms-of-trade externality continues to provide the only rationale for a trade agreement.
2 Trade Policies and Market Power
We begin with a simple 2-country partial-equilibrium model in which the good under consideration
is produced by a monopolist in the domestic country and consumed in both the domestic and
foreign countries. The domestic country thus exports this good to the foreign country. We assume
that the domestic and foreign markets are integrated, so that the domestic monopolist cannot price
discriminate across the two markets. Any di⁄erence in prices across the two markets then derives
from trade policies. The alternative case of segmented markets is considered in the Appendix.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We assume that a monopolist resides in the domestic country, selling good y to domestic consumers
and also exporting good y to foreign consumers. The local price in the domestic market is P and
3the domestic demand function is D(P); likewise, the local price in the foreign country is P￿ and the
foreign demand function is D￿(P￿). Both demand functions are downward sloping and positive.
The government of the domestic country has an export policy, t, where t > 0 indicates an export
tari⁄(expressed in speci￿c terms); and the government of the foreign country has an import policy,
t￿, where t￿ > 0 corresponds to an import tari⁄ (expressed in speci￿c terms). The markets are
integrated. This means that any wedge between the prices P and P￿ must equal the sum of the
export and import tari⁄s for non-prohibitive trade taxes: letting ￿ ￿ t + t￿, it then follows that
P￿ = P + ￿. Let us de￿ne the world (i.e., o⁄shore) price as Pw = P + t = P￿ ￿ t￿. Since both
governments may use trade policies, the world price is distinct from both local prices.
When markets are integrated and trade policies t and t￿ are given, the monopolist chooses P
(and thereby P￿ = P + ￿) to maximize pro￿t in the domestic and foreign markets:
￿(P;￿) = [P ￿ co]D(P) + [P ￿ co]D￿(P + ￿);
where co is the constant marginal cost of production for the monopolist. We assume that the
second-order condition for pro￿t maximization holds. The associated ￿rst-order condition balances
the e⁄ect of a price increase across the integrated markets and may be written as follows:5
￿P(P;￿) = [P ￿ co]D0(P) + D(P) + [P ￿ co]D￿0(P + ￿) + D￿(P + ￿) = 0: (1)
As (1) indicates, the pro￿t-maximizing or monopoly price depends on ￿, the total tari⁄ on trade
￿ ows from the domestic to the foreign country, and so we represent the monopoly price function as
P(￿). Given downward-sloping demand functions, (1) also implies that the monopoly price function
entails a positive markup over unit production costs: P(￿) > co. Since Pw = P + t = P￿ ￿ t￿, we
may use P￿(￿) = P(￿) + ￿ to denote the corresponding monopoly price function for foreign sales
and Pw(t;t￿) to represent the corresponding world price function.
For a large family of demand functions, including linear demand functions, P(￿) declines as
the total tari⁄ ￿ rises.6 In this case of incomplete pass through, the monopolist absorbs some of
the incidence of trade taxes and thus reduces the price at which it sells. More generally, the ￿nal
price paid by foreign consumers, P￿(￿), rises with ￿.7 In what follows we therefore assume P￿ rises
and P falls with the total tari⁄ ￿. Finally, we note that our assumptions ensure that the world
price, Pw(t;t￿), rises with the export tari⁄ t and falls with the import tari⁄ t￿. The domestic
country thus enjoys a terms-of-trade improvement when the domestic export tari⁄ is increased or
the foreign import tari⁄ is reduced, whereas the foreign country enjoys a terms-of-trade gain when
the domestic export tari⁄ is reduced or the foreign import tari⁄ is increased.
5In keeping with our focus on non-prohibitive tari⁄s, we maintain the assumption here and throughout that it is
optimal for the monopolist to sell strictly positive volume in each country for all relevant tari⁄ levels.




￿) < 0 at the monopoly selection. For this
condition, it is thus su¢ cient if D
￿00(P
￿) ￿ 0, but this inequality is clearly not necessary.
7We ￿nd that P
￿(￿) is increasing in ￿ if (P ￿ co)D
00(P) + 2D
0(P) < 0. This is the traditional second-order
condition that would apply if the monopolist sold only in the domestic market. This condition holds, for example, if
D
00(P) ￿ 0, although this inequality is clearly not necessary.
42.2 Welfare Functions
We next consider government welfare functions. To begin, we assume that each government maxi-
mizes the welfare of its country. Domestic country welfare is then
[P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + [P￿ ￿ (co + ￿)]D￿(P￿) + tD￿(P￿);
where CS(P) denotes domestic consumer surplus. The ￿rst two terms represent domestic welfare
on domestically sold units, the third term captures (post-tari⁄) pro￿t on exported units, and the
￿nal term is domestic tari⁄ revenue. We may simplify and represent domestic country welfare as
W(P;P￿;Pw) = [P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + [Pw ￿ co]D￿(P￿): (2)
Domestic country welfare is ultimately a function of the underlying tari⁄s; however, for our pur-
poses, it is more useful to write welfare as a function of prices (which are themselves determined
by tari⁄s), as we can then identify the speci￿c channels through which trade policies a⁄ect welfare.
Notice from (2) that domestic welfare depends on the foreign local price, P￿, since the domestic
monopolist has market power and selects P and thus P￿, with the units exported at the price P￿
then determined by the foreign demand function. This feature distinguishes the current setting
from one in which domestic production takes place under conditions of perfect competition. In
that case, with price-taking ￿rms, domestic welfare can again be written as the sum of producer
surplus, consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue. But the domestic local price P then determines the
levels of domestic production and domestic consumption, and so P determines as well domestic
export volume, domestic producer surplus and domestic consumer surplus. Given that t = Pw￿P,
it is then possible to express domestic tari⁄ revenue as a function of P and Pw. As a consequence,
with a competitive domestic production sector, all components of domestic welfare are determined
once P and Pw are given, and so domestic welfare can be written as W(P;Pw) in that case.8
Hence, as (2) con￿rms, there is a new international externality present for the domestic govern-
ment when market power is present in the domestic export sector: in addition to the terms-of-trade
externality that travels through Pw, there is also a (foreign) local-price externality that runs through
P￿. This indicates a more complex international policy environment when market power is present,
and it raises the possibility that the task of a trade agreement may be more complicated in this
environment as a result. Nevertheless, the fundamental question for our purposes here is whether
governments would make unilateral policy choices that internalize these international externali-
ties ￿whatever form these externalities might take ￿in an appropriate fashion from a world-wide
perspective. To answer this question, we need to go further and fully characterize the remaining
features of the model, so that we may then examine the Nash and e¢ cient policy choices in detail
and evaluate the precise reasons for any divergence between them.
To this end, we complete our characterization of government welfare functions by considering
8For further discussion of this case, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001).
5the foreign country. Foreign country welfare takes the following simple form:
W￿(P￿;Pw) = CS￿(P￿) + [P￿ ￿ Pw]D￿(P￿); (3)
where CS￿(P￿) denotes foreign consumer surplus and [P￿ ￿ Pw]D￿(P￿) is foreign tari⁄ revenue.
As with domestic welfare, we express foreign welfare as a function of prices in order to isolate the
speci￿c channels through which trade policies a⁄ect welfare.
2.3 Nash and E¢ cient Tari⁄s
We may now characterize the Nash policy choices, which we take to be the optimal policies that the
governments would choose unilaterally in the absence of a trade agreement. We assume that the
respective second-order conditions are satis￿ed and focus on the associated ￿rst-order conditions
for welfare maximization. Using the expressions for domestic and foreign welfare developed above,
and noting that d￿
dt = 1 = d￿
dt￿, the ￿rst-order conditions that jointly de￿ne the Nash choices of t



















Evaluating the Nash conditions in (4) using the explicit expressions for welfare in (2) and (3) and
the monopolist￿ s ￿rst-order condition (1), it is direct to show that the foreign government imposes
an import tari⁄ in the Nash equilibrium, while the domestic government may impose either an
export tax or an export subsidy in the Nash equilibrium depending on demand conditions.
Intuitively, the Nash export policy tN for the domestic country maximizes W(P;P￿;Pw) and
thus internalizes the e⁄ects of the induced changes in P, P￿ and Pw on domestic welfare. If
domestic demand were nonexistent, then the Nash export tax would be zero, because in that case
the objectives of the domestic monopolist would coincide with domestic welfare. In the presence of
domestic demand, however, two additional considerations arise. On the one hand, an export tax
has a bene￿cial e⁄ect in lessening the existing monopoly distortion in the domestic market (i.e., it
pushes P down toward co), and if this consideration dominates then the Nash export policy is an
export tax. On the other hand, under an export subsidy foreign consumers pay a lower price than
domestic consumers, and given appropriate demand conditions it is possible that facilitating the
implied price discrimination across markets for the domestic monopolist has a su¢ ciently bene￿cial
e⁄ect on domestic welfare that the Nash export policy is an export subsidy.9
9In particular, we ￿nd that t
N ￿ 0 if and only if [￿D(P)
dP
dt ] ￿ [(P ￿co)D
0(P)+D(P)] when t = 0 and t
￿ = t
￿N.
The left-hand-side of this condition is strictly positive. By examining the monopoly ￿rst-order condition (1), it can
be seen that the right-hand-side of this condition is zero when the monopolist has no incentive to price-discriminate
across markets, and so the condition is met in that case; and it is negative when the monopolist would like to price-
discriminate in favor of the domestic market, and so the condition is met in that case as well; but the right-hand-side
is positive when the monopolist would like to price-discriminate in favor of the foreign market, and under appropriate
demand conditions it can be su¢ ciently positive to violate the condition above and imply t
N < 0 .
6The Nash import tari⁄ t￿N for the foreign country maximizes W￿(P￿;Pw) and thus internal-
izes the e⁄ects of the induced changes in P￿ and Pw on foreign welfare. The foreign local price
determines the level of foreign demand. It thereby determines consumer surplus in the foreign coun-
try and also impacts foreign tari⁄ revenue. The world price a⁄ects welfare in the foreign country
through its e⁄ect on foreign tari⁄ revenue. The Nash import tari⁄ for the foreign country weighs
the tari⁄ revenue collected from the domestic monopolist against the loss in foreign consumer sur-
plus, and it is positive provided that the demand function is such that the exporting monopolist
does not pass through the full tari⁄ (as we assume).10
It is instructive at this point to consider more generally the interpretation of the Nash policy
choices. Let us ￿rst examine the tari⁄ choice of the foreign country. As we observe above, foreign
welfare may be expressed in the form W￿(P￿;Pw). Consider now Figure 1a. With the foreign
import tari⁄ t￿ on the vertical axis and the home export tax t on the horizontal axis, an initial
tari⁄ pair is represented by the point A ￿ (t￿;t). This pair is associated with a foreign iso-local-
price line (i.e., an iso-tari⁄-sum line), denoted as P￿(A) ! P￿(A), and an iso-world-price line,
depicted as Pw(A) ! Pw(A). In light of the property established above that the foreign price can
be written as P￿(￿), the iso-local-price line has slope ￿1. The iso-world-price line has a positive
slope, because the world price can be held ￿xed only if an increase in the foreign export tax is
balanced against an increase in the domestic import tari⁄. For a ￿xed t, when t￿ is increased
to t￿1, a new point C ￿ (t￿1;t) is induced. This point lies on new iso-price lines, represented as
P￿(C) ! P￿(C) and Pw(C) ! Pw(C), and the foreign local (world) price is now higher (lower)
than it was originally at A.
As the bottom equation of (4) suggests, the overall movement from A to C in Figure 1a can
be disentangled into separate movements in the world and foreign local prices, respectively. The
movement from A to B re￿ ects the induced fall in the world price, holding ￿xed the foreign local
price, and the associated welfare implications for the foreign country are re￿ ected in the bottom
equation of (4) by the term W￿
Pw. Similarly, the movement from B to C isolates the foreign local
price change, with the corresponding foreign welfare change re￿ ected in the bottom equation of
(4) by the term W￿
P￿. Exactly as in a competitive setting, the world price movement from A to B
can be interpreted as a form of international rent-shifting/cost-shifting: if the foreign government
wishes to implement a foreign local price corresponding to the iso-local-price line P￿(C) ! P￿(C),
then a unilateral increase in the foreign import tari⁄ passes some of the costs of this outcome to
the domestic country, whose exports are sold at a lower world price. Further, in our model with
export-sector market power, the domestic country also has a direct interest in the foreign local
price that the foreign government wishes to implement. The foreign government, of course, ignores
this interest when choosing its Nash import tari⁄.
We next turn to an examination of the tari⁄choice of the domestic country. As we observe above,
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dt￿ > 0, since we assume
that P(￿) and thus P
w(t;t
￿) = P(￿) + t is decreasing in t
￿.
7foreign local prices in the domestic welfare function implies that the interpretation of the Nash tari⁄
choice that we develop just above for the foreign country cannot be applied directly to the domestic
country tari⁄ choice. Nevertheless, an analogous interpretation does apply once the appropriate
observations are made. To see why, consider Figure 1b. With the domestic export tax t now on
the vertical axis and the foreign import tari⁄ t￿ now on the horizontal axis, an initial tari⁄ pair is
represented by the point A ￿ (t;t￿) in Figure 1b. The key observation is that both P and P￿ are
tied down once the sum of t and t￿ (and hence ￿) is tied down. Therefore, the tari⁄ pair at A is
associated with a domestic-and-foreign iso-local-price line (i.e., an iso-tari⁄-sum line), denoted as
P(A);P￿(A) ! P(A);P￿(A), and an iso-world-price line, depicted as Pw(A) ! Pw(A). As before,
the iso-local-price line has slope ￿1, while the iso-world-price line has a positive slope. For a ￿xed
t￿, when t is increased to t1, a new point C ￿ (t1;t￿) is induced. This point lies on new iso-price
lines, represented as P(C);P￿(C) ! P(C);P￿(C) and Pw(C) ! Pw(C), and the domestic local
price is now lower than it was originally at A, while the foreign local price and the world price are
now each higher than they were originally at A.
As the top equation of (4) suggests, the overall movement from A to C in Figure 1b can
be disentangled into separate movements in the world price, and in the domestic and foreign
local prices, respectively. The movement from A to B re￿ ects the induced increase in the world
price, holding ￿xed the domestic and foreign local prices, and the welfare implications of this
change for the domestic country are associated in the top equation of (4) with the term WPw.
Similarly, the movement from B to C isolates the domestic and foreign local price changes, with
the corresponding domestic welfare change captured in the top equation of (4) with the terms WP
and WP￿. Despite the added complication of the extra term WP￿ in the top equation of (4), it
may now be seen that the domestic Nash tari⁄ choice admits an analogous interpretation to the
foreign Nash choice. Speci￿cally, and exactly as in a competitive setting, the world price movement
from A to B can be interpreted as a form of international cost-shifting: if the domestic government
wishes to implement a domestic-and-foreign local price pair corresponding to the iso-local-price line
P(C);P￿(C) ! P(C);P￿(C), then a unilateral increase in its export tax passes some of the costs
of this outcome to the foreign country, whose imports are purchased at a higher world price. A
novel feature of our model with export-sector market power is that the foreign country also has a
direct interest in one of the local prices (the foreign local price) that the domestic country wishes
to implement. The domestic government ignores this interest when setting its Nash export tari⁄.
To formally evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of the Nash tari⁄ choices, we ￿rst need to charac-
terize the trade policy choices that would be internationally e¢ cient in this environment. Consider,
then, an e¢ cient or joint-welfare maximizing agreement that would maximize the sum of W and
W￿. The world price cancels from this summation: the world price a⁄ects the distribution of rents
across countries but does not in itself a⁄ect e¢ ciency. This observation provides one simple way of
understanding why tari⁄ policies that are motivated by terms-of-trade e⁄ects lead to ine¢ ciencies.
But we may still ask whether any other sources of ine¢ ciency are present. To address this question,
8we express joint welfare as
J(P;P￿) = W(P;P￿;Pw)+W￿(P￿;Pw) = [P￿co]D(P)+CS(P)+[P￿￿co]D￿(P￿)+CS￿(P￿): (5)
As inspection of (5) con￿rms, joint welfare is maximized at the perfectly competitive prices: P =
P￿ = co.11 Governments, however, are unable to deliver these prices using only their export and
import tari⁄s. Under free trade policies, the monopolist sets P = P￿ > co, and deadweight loss
results. Using a positive total tari⁄ ￿, governments could steer supply toward the domestic market
and push the domestic local price down to co. But a positive ￿ introduces a wedge between P and
P￿, making it impossible that P￿ could also be set equal to co. An e¢ cient tari⁄pair would balance
e¢ ciency objectives across markets with the ￿nal outcome satisfying co < P and co < P￿.12
We next characterize the e¢ cient tari⁄s at a formal level. At the e¢ cient tari⁄s, it is impossible
to increase joint welfare by changing the domestic export tari⁄or the foreign export tari⁄. Recalling
that the world price cancels from the joint welfare expression, and that the local prices P and P￿
depend only on the tari⁄ sum ￿, it follows that e¢ ciency only ties down the sum of the two tari⁄s.












E¢ ciency requires only that t and t￿ be chosen so that the total tari⁄ ￿ satis￿es (6).
We may now formally con￿rm that the Nash tari⁄ choices are indeed ine¢ cient. This can be
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where in writing (7) we have used the fact that (2) implies WPw = D￿(P￿) and (3) implies W￿
Pw =
￿D￿(P￿). The term D￿(P￿)[@Pw
@t ￿ @Pw







d￿ must be negative when evaluated at Nash tari⁄ choices. But then, under the
assumption that the second-order condition for joint-welfare maximization holds, (6) implies that
the sum of the Nash tari⁄s is above that required for e¢ ciency: in the Nash equilibrium, trade
volume (D￿(P￿)) is ine¢ ciently low.
2.4 Politically Optimal Tari⁄s
To determine the reason for the ine¢ ciency of the Nash tari⁄ choices, we now follow Bagwell and
Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne politically optimal tari⁄s as those tari⁄s that would hypothetically
11If all units of good y were sold domestically, then the domestic welfare function would take the form [P￿co]D(P)+
CS(P). In this setting, as is well known, domestic country welfare is maximized at the perfect-competition outcome
(i.e., when P = co). The same logic applies as well for the foreign country.
12Suppose, for example, that ￿ > 0 delivers P = co. The term [P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) is then maximized; thus, by
reducing the total tari⁄and raising P slightly, the reduction in this term would only be second order. At the same time,
a lower total tari⁄ would reduce P






Likewise, if ￿ < 0, then it would not be e¢ cient to drive P
￿ to or below co.
9be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value the pure international rent-shifting
associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄choices. Speci￿cally,
we suppose that the home government acts as if WPw ￿ 0 when choosing its politically optimal
tari⁄, while the foreign government acts as if W￿
Pw ￿ 0 when choosing its politically optimal tari⁄.













With politically optimal tari⁄s de￿ned in this way, we may ask whether politically optimal tari⁄s
are e¢ cient, and thereby explore whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed above can be given a
terms-of-trade interpretation, according to which the fundamental problem faced by governments
in designing their trade agreement is to ￿nd a way to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulation.
With regard to the nature of the thought experiment envisioned in the politically optimal tar-
i⁄s, there is an important distinction between the perfectly competitive environment considered in
Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) and the imperfectly competitive setting that we analyze here. In
the perfectly competitive setting, domestic welfare can be written as W(P;Pw), and the politically
optimal tari⁄ for the domestic government then satis￿es WP
dP
d￿ = 0. Thus, in the case of perfect
competition, it is immaterial whether the thought experiment associated with politically optimal
tari⁄s is interpreted to mean that the government acts ￿as if￿WPw ￿ 0 or rather that the gov-
ernment acts ￿as if￿ @Pw
@t ￿ 0, because either way we have WPw @Pw
@t ￿ 0.13 Notice that, under
the second interpretation, politically optimal tari⁄s are the tari⁄s that governments would choose
unilaterally if they were ￿small￿in world markets. In the presence of imperfectly competitive ￿rms,
however, this second interpretation is not valid. To see why, recall that the domestic welfare func-
tion now includes P￿ and observe as well that the relationship Pw = P￿ ￿ t￿ implies @Pw
@t = dP￿
d￿ .
Consequently, if the domestic government were to act ￿as if￿ @Pw
@t ￿ 0, it would then by necessity
also act ￿as if￿ dP￿
d￿ = 0, and so its unilaterally chosen tari⁄ would satisfy WP
dP
d￿ = 0, which di⁄ers
from the expression for the politically optimal domestic tari⁄in (8) above. In e⁄ect, in the presence
of imperfect competition, it no longer makes sense to think of a hypothetical situation in which
governments act as if they were small in world markets, because their ￿rms are not small.
We now proceed to o⁄er a formal evaluation of the e¢ ciency properties of politically optimal
tari⁄s as de￿ned by (8). This is easily done: the two conditions in (8), when summed together,
imply the condition in (6). We thus now have the following result: politically optimal tari⁄s are
e¢ cient. Put di⁄erently, if governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-
shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄ choices,
then they would set e¢ cient tari⁄s.
To understand this result at a more speci￿c level, we refer to Figures 2a-c. In Figures 2a and 2b,
13Bagwell and Staiger (1999, footnote 11) stress the ￿rst of these interpretations in their formal analysis, but both
interpretations are valid in the competitive markets setting.
10we illustrate the manner in which the domestic government determines its politically optimal export
tari⁄. Figure 2a isolates the e⁄ects in the foreign market of a higher export tari⁄. The bold lines
identify market values at initial export and import tari⁄s, t￿ and t, respectively, where we assume
for now that both tari⁄s are positive. The dotted lines identify the values that are determined after
an increase in the export tari⁄. As Figure 2a illustrates, the domestic country initially enjoys tari⁄
revenue (denoted as TR) in the amount (Pw ￿P)D￿(P￿) and pro￿t on exported units (denoted as
PSx) in the amount (P￿co)D￿(P￿), so that the overall bene￿t that the domestic government enjoys
from foreign sales is (Pw ￿ co)D￿(P￿): The foreign country likewise enjoys tari⁄ revenue (denoted
as TR￿) in the amount (P￿￿Pw)D￿(P￿) and consumer surplus (denoted as CS￿) as represented by
the triangular area above P￿ and below the demand curve. As the domestic government increases
its export tari⁄, local and world prices change, and we illustrate these changes with arrows. In
particular, the foreign local price P￿ rises, leading to a reduction in foreign demand and thus trade
volume. Consequently, the domestic country su⁄ers a loss in tari⁄ revenue and pro￿t, with each
unit of lost sales being valued at rate (Pw ￿ co). In this way, a higher foreign local price generates
a welfare loss (denoted by L1 and L2) for the domestic government in the foreign market.
Figure 2a thus identi￿es a cost to the domestic government of a higher export tari⁄. This cost is
attributable to the reduced trade volume that arises as a consequence of the induced higher foreign
local price. The domestic government weighs this cost when determining its politically optimal
export policy. Figure 2a also illustrates two e⁄ects that the domestic government does not weigh
when setting its politically optimal export policy. First, a higher export tari⁄ generates a terms-
of-trade gain (denoted as G(TOT)) for the domestic government, which as Figure 2a illustrates
amounts to a direct transfer from the foreign treasury (i.e., from TR￿) to the domestic treasury
(i.e., to TR). A government ignores pure international rent shifting of this nature when setting its
politically optimal tari⁄ policy. Second, when the domestic government sets its politically optimal
export policy, it also ignores the fact that the induced reduction in trade volume itself lowers
foreign tari⁄ revenue when the foreign import tari⁄ is positive. This loss (denoted as Z) to the
foreign government identi￿es a negative international externality that is associated with local-price
movements and suggests that the politically optimal domestic export tari⁄may be ine¢ ciently high
if the foreign import tari⁄ is positive.
In Figure 2b, we isolate the e⁄ect of a higher export tari⁄in the domestic market. As illustrated,
a higher export tari⁄ induces a lower domestic local price P. Since the domestic market is initially
distorted due to the presence of monopoly power, the domestic government gains in the domestic
market when the export tari⁄ is increased and greater domestic sales are generated. This gain
corresponds to the new consumer surplus (denoted as G1) and the new pro￿t (denoted as G2)
that are enjoyed on units that are domestically consumed only after the higher export tari⁄ is
imposed. When setting its politically optimal export tari⁄, the domestic government thus evaluates
an increase in its export tari⁄ by balancing the losses in the foreign market (i.e., L1 + L2) against
the gains in the domestic market (i.e., G1 +G2). The domestic government thus sets its politically
optimal export policy so as to achieve an optimal balance in its attempt to diminish both markups.
11The politically optimal export policy is therefore sensitive to the relative slopes of the domestic
and foreign demand functions.
We turn now to Figure 2c and consider the politically optimal import tari⁄ for the foreign
government. Here, it is convenient to assume that the foreign import tari⁄is initially zero and that
the foreign government is contemplating an increase in the import tari⁄. For simplicity, in Figure
2c, we assume that the domestic export tari⁄is positive. If the foreign government raises its import
tari⁄ to a positive level, then the foreign local price P￿ rises and trade volume is again reduced. As
well, the world price falls, and the foreign country thus enjoys a terms-of-trade gain (denoted as
G￿(TOT)) that amounts to a pure rent transfer from the domestic treasury to the foreign treasury.
When setting its politically optimal import policy, however, the foreign government ignores this
terms-of-trade e⁄ect and instead focuses on the fact that a higher import tari⁄ induces a higher
foreign local price and thus a loss in foreign consumer surplus (denoted as L￿). As Figure 2c
suggests, then, the politically optimal import policy for the foreign government is a policy of free
trade. In fact, this observation can be easily formalized at a general level. At the political optimum,
we see from (8) that W￿
P￿ = 0. This condition implies in turn that P￿ = Pw, from which we conclude
that the politically optimal tari⁄ for the foreign country is free trade: t￿
PO = 0.14
At this point, we may return to consider the domestic government. When setting its politically
optimal export policy, the domestic government internalizes all of the gains (i.e., G1 + G2) of a
reduction in deadweight loss in the domestic market; however, it internalizes all of the losses (i.e.,
L1+L2+Z) of an increase in deadweight loss in the foreign market if and only if the foreign import
tari⁄is zero (i.e., if and only if Z = 0). But we have just argued that the politically optimal import
tari⁄ for the foreign government is zero; therefore, the domestic government internalizes all of the
gains and losses in joint welfare when setting its politically optimal export policy. In short, when
the foreign government adopts a policy of free trade, the domestic government￿ s export policy no
longer generates an international externality through the induced change in the foreign local price.
For this reason, politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient.
A general perspective on this result is possible with reference to Figures 1a and 1b. Consider,
for instance, the trade-o⁄s faced by the domestic government as depicted in Figure 1b. If the
domestic government seeks to achieve a pair of domestic and foreign local prices corresponding to
the iso-local-price line P(C);P￿(C) ! P(C);P￿(C), then the attainment of this pair of local prices
involves no world-price externality when the domestic government￿ s higher export tax is balanced
against a higher foreign import tari⁄, so that the world price is not altered. This corresponds in
Figure 1b to the movement from A to D. When the domestic government is not motivated by the
terms-of-trade implications of its tari⁄ policy, it prefers choosing a higher export tax and inducing























￿) is a downward-sloping demand function, we conclude that
W
￿
P￿ = 0 if and only if P
￿ = P
w. We note that the foreign country￿ s politically optimal tari⁄ is thus independent
of the home country￿ s export tari⁄. As we establish in the next section, this independence property disappears when
we allow for production in the foreign country.
12point D to point A. If both governments choose tari⁄s in this fashion (so that in Figure 1a the
foreign government prefers choosing a higher import tari⁄and inducing point C instead of selecting
a lower import tari⁄ and inducing point A if and only if it also prefers point D to point A), then
a resulting consistent set of tari⁄s is politically optimal. In this case, the tari⁄s that governments
select are not motivated by the cost-shifting e⁄ects of movements in the terms of trade.
While the domestic government￿ s willingness to move from point A to point D in Figure 1b
induces no externality on the foreign country through the terms of trade, it will involve a change
in the foreign local price. If the foreign government also selects a tari⁄ that is politically optimal,
however, then a small change in the foreign local price will not alter the foreign welfare to the ￿rst
order.15 Similarly, the foreign government￿ s willingness to move from point A to point D in Figure
1a induces no externality on the domestic country through the terms of trade, but it will involve
a change in both the domestic and the foreign local price. If the domestic government also selects
a tari⁄ that is politically optimal, however, then this small change in the domestic and the foreign
local price will not alter the domestic welfare to the ￿rst order. In sum, when governments adopt
politically optimal tari⁄s, they are not motivated to impose terms-of-trade externalities on one
another, and the international externalities associated with local-price movements are eliminated.
We thus now have a general perspective as to why politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient.
Building from this perspective, let us now suppose that the domestic government chooses its
export tax mindful of the terms-of-trade externality associated with movements in the world price
(i.e., the movement from D to C in Figure 1b). It then recognizes that some of the costs of achieving
the lower domestic and higher foreign local prices are shifted on to the foreign country through
the resulting increase in the world price. As a result, the domestic government can be expected to
choose a higher export tax (i.e., restrict trade volume more) than is jointly e¢ cient. An analogous
observation applies to the foreign government. This explains why Nash trade policies are always
ine¢ cient, with trade volumes that are necessarily too low. The broad conclusion that emerges is
therefore that an ine¢ ciency arises when governments set trade policies unilaterally if and only if
they are motivated by terms-of-trade considerations, exactly as in the case of competitive markets
analyzed in Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001).
2.5 The Rationale for a Trade Agreement
We can now explicitly consider the rationale for a trade agreement in the model with export-sector
monopoly power. To this end, we extend the model slightly beyond the single-good setting to allow
that the foreign country is the mirror image of the domestic country. Thus, while the domestic
country has a monopolist that sells good y in domestic and foreign markets, the foreign country
likewise has a monopolist that sells good x in the foreign and domestic markets. The partial-
equilibrium model can then be closed to achieve general equilibrium in the usual way with the
addition of a traded numeraire good z that enters linearly into the welfare of each country and
15Recall that W
￿
P￿ = 0 when the foreign government sets its politically optimal tari⁄. As we discuss above, the
foreign country￿ s politically optimal tari⁄ is thus free trade, which ensures that the area Z in Figure 2a is eliminated.
13which is always consumed in positive amounts by the representative agent of each country.
Within this extended 3-good setting, if governments set their unilateral policies so as to maxi-
mize the welfare of their respective countries, then a trade agreement between the two governments
would o⁄er scope for mutual gains if and only if the unilateral policies give rise to an ine¢ cient
outcome. As we argue above, when governments are motivated by the terms-of-trade consequences
of their trade policies and set their unilaterally optimal tari⁄s, an ine¢ ciency is created in the
resulting Nash equilibrium. And we have further shown that, if governments were not motivated
by the terms-of-trade consequences of their trade policies, then the resulting politically optimal
trade policies would be e¢ cient. Thus, in the model with export-sector monopoly power, if each
government maximizes the welfare of its country, we conclude that the only rationale for a trade
agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume.
We next show that this conclusion continues to hold even when governments have political-
economic objectives. To this end, we return to the single-good setting and now allow that the
domestic government may value pro￿t more heavily than consumer surplus and tari⁄revenue. For-
mally, we suppose that the domestic government maximizes the political-economic welfare function
￿[P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + ￿[P￿ ￿ (co + ￿)]D￿(P￿) + tD￿(P￿);
where ￿ ￿ 1 is a political-economy weight (see, e.g., Baldwin, 1987, and Grossman and Helpman,
1994). The domestic government thus maximizes domestic country welfare when ￿ = 1 and values
pro￿t more heavily than consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue when ￿ > 1. As before, we may
substitute for tari⁄s and rewrite government welfare as a function of local and world prices:
W(P;P￿;Pw;￿) = ￿[P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + ￿[P ￿ co]D￿(P￿) + [Pw ￿ P]D￿(P￿): (9)
Holding ￿xed the volumes of domestic and foreign consumption, an increase in P transfers surplus
from domestic consumers (on domestically traded units) and tari⁄ revenue (on internationally
traded units) to pro￿t. This redistribution has no e⁄ect on domestic country welfare, but it raises
the welfare of the domestic government when ￿ > 1. The welfare of the foreign government is again
given by the sum of foreign consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue as de￿ned in (3): in the foreign
country, no ￿rms produce good y, and so we do not include a political-economy parameter there.
A key observation from (9) and (3) is that joint welfare (i.e., the sum of W(P;P￿;Pw;￿) and
W￿(P￿;Pw)) is again independent of the world price. Whether or not the domestic government
has political-economic motivations, a change in the world price amounts to a pure transfer across
governments with the associated rent moving from one treasury to the other. We thus may again
represent joint welfare as a function of local prices only:
J(P;P￿;￿) = W(P;P￿;Pw;￿) + W￿(P;P￿): (10)
We may de￿ne e¢ cient tari⁄s relative to J(P;P￿;￿) as those satisfying the conditions in (6), and
14Nash and politically optimal tari⁄s relative to W(P;P￿;Pw;￿) and W￿(P;P￿) as those respectively
satisfying (4) and (8). Exactly as before, we may then show that Nash tari⁄s are ine¢ cient, while
politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient. Thus, in the model with export-sector monopoly power, for
governments with political-economic preferences, we conclude that the only rationale for a trade
agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume.16
Notice the important role played by both import and export policies for this conclusion. If,
for example, governments were assumed only to have import tari⁄s (t￿ for the foreign government,
with the home government passive in its export sector) at their disposal, then it is still the case
that e¢ ciency would be de￿ned as in (6) above, owing to the redundancy of the instruments t and
t￿ in terms of their impacts on P and P￿. The e¢ cient total tari⁄ would then be achieved entirely
through the import tari⁄, t￿. But as can be seen from the conditions for the political optimum
in (8), the politically optimal setting of t￿ alone could not in general achieve e¢ ciency. In the
absence of political-economy motivations, for example, the political optimum when only import
tari⁄s are available entails free trade, which is generally not e¢ cient in the presence of a monopoly
exporter.17 Therefore, the e¢ ciency of the political optimum ￿and hence the ability to interpret
the problem that a trade agreement can solve as a terms-of-trade problem ￿hinges importantly on
the assumption that governments have su¢ cient trade-tax instruments at their disposal. If they
did not, then other non-terms-of-trade problems might also be addressed by a trade agreement (in
this setting, just as more generally). But viewed in this way, it is also clear what the associated
non-terms-of-trade problem would be: a trade agreement could help substitute for missing trade
policy instruments (e.g., export policies) which, if available, would then convert the role of a trade
agreement back to the standard terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿Dilemma.18
We summarize the results of this section as follows:
Proposition 1 In the model with export-sector monopoly power, and for governments with or
without political-economic preferences, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the
ine¢ cient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume.
2.6 Reciprocity
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that, for the model with export-sector market power,
just as in the competitive benchmark model, a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of
16Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 9) present a related result in a general equilibrium 2-country trade model where
imperfectly competitive production takes place in the import-competing sector of one of the countries.
17A second possibility is that governments have available only export policies. In this case, the foreign import
tari⁄ is ￿xed at free trade, and e¢ ciency must be achieved through the setting of the domestic export policy. Recall
now that, in the absence of political-economy motivations, the politically optimal setting of the import tari⁄ is free
trade; thus, in this case, the e¢ ciency of the political optimum does not require that import tari⁄s be available.
However, when political-economy motives are present, and more generally for other market structures as we show in
later sections, this special feature of politically optimal tari⁄s does not hold, and both import and export policies
must be available to ensure the e¢ ciency of the political optimum.
18To be clear, what is required for the e¢ ciency of the political optimum is that each country has a complete set of
import and export tax instruments, not that each country has a complete set of (trade and domestic) tax instruments
with which to achieve the ￿rst best.
15reciprocity can guide governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier.
To establish this implication, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne tari⁄ changes
that conform to reciprocity as those that bring about equal changes in the volume of each country￿ s
imports and exports when valued at existing world prices.
Working within the 3-good general equilibrium interpretation of the model described above,
taking account of trade in the numeraire good, denoting by ty and t￿
y the domestic and foreign
trade taxes on domestic exports of good y (with associated tari⁄ sum ￿y) and by tx and t￿
x the
domestic and foreign trade taxes on foreign exports of good x (with associated tari⁄ sum ￿x), and
letting a superscript ￿0￿denote original trade tax levels and a superscript ￿1￿denote new trade
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where we now distinguish between goods x and y by adding subscripts to prices and demand
functions as well. According to (11), tari⁄changes that conform to reciprocity imply either that (i)
all world prices are left unchanged as a result of the tari⁄changes, or (ii) world prices are altered in
a net-revenue neutral fashion, so that there exists an alternative set of tari⁄ changes which would
preserve all local prices at their new levels but restore all world prices to their original levels, and
which would therefore leave each country indi⁄erent between the original tari⁄ changes and this
alternative.20 Either way, it is clear that there can be no pure international rent shifting across
countries as a result of tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity. And it is also clear that we can,
henceforth and without loss of generality, equate tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity in this
setting with tari⁄ changes that leave world prices unaltered.
We are now prepared to interpret and evaluate the principle of reciprocity. To this end, we again
focus on the domestic export good and thus return to our original (single-good-setting) notation.
As just established, tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity leave the world price of this good
unaltered and thus a⁄ect domestic and foreign welfare through the induced changes in local prices.
We make two observations.21 First, starting at the Nash equilibrium, the domestic and foreign
19The steps to derive (11) employ the balanced trade condition that must hold at the original and the new world
prices, and are identical to those described in note 19 of Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
20Point (ii) can be con￿rmed as follows. Consider the home country. Observe ￿rst that there exists an alternative
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x ), and that under these
alternative new trade taxes the reciprocity condition (11) is met. It remains to con￿rm that the net trade tax revenue
collected by the home country is the same under either set of new trade taxes. To conserve notation, we now suppress
tari⁄ arguments and let a superscript ￿0￿on a price denote that price as a function of original trade tax levels, and
let a superscript ￿1￿on a price denote that price as a function of new trade tax levels, and let a superscript ￿1
0￿on
a price denote that price as a function of alternative new trade tax levels. Now observe that domestic net revenue
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y ), and hence domestic net revenue under the two sets of














x). But this condition is
guaranteed by the reciprocity condition (11). An analogous argument holds for the foreign country.
21These two observations mirror the two ways in which the principle of reciprocity ￿nds representation in the
GATT/WTO. See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) for more on the role of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO.
16countries must both gain from a small reduction in trade taxes that satis￿es reciprocity. Beginning
from Nash policies, a small reduction in domestic trade taxes that is reciprocated by a reduction in






d￿ ], where the ￿rst term in brackets is positive under our assump-
tions.22 Referring now to the top condition in (4) and using WPw @Pw
@t = D￿(P￿)@Pw
@t > 0, we see
that ￿[WP
dP
d￿ + WP￿ dP￿
d￿ ] > 0 at the Nash policies. We thus conclude that the domestic country
must gain from this reciprocal trade liberalization. Similarly, if we begin at Nash policies and
consider a small reduction in foreign trade taxes that is reciprocated by a reduction in domestic





d￿ ], where the ￿rst
bracketed term is again positive under our assumptions. We may now refer to the bottom condition




@t￿ > 0 in order to conclude that ￿[W￿
P￿
dP￿
d￿ ] > 0 at the Nash
policies. Thus, the foreign country must also gain.
Second, if countries negotiate to the political optimum, then neither country has an interest in
unilaterally raising its trade tax if it is understood that such an act would be met with a reciprocal
action from its trading partner. To con￿rm this observation, let us begin at the politically optimal
policies. A small increase in domestic trade taxes that is reciprocated by an increase in foreign





d￿ ]. At the political
optimum, however, the top condition in (8) ensures that WP
dP
d￿ +WP￿ dP￿
d￿ = 0. Thus, the domestic
country cannot gain from a small tari⁄ increase that is met by a reciprocal response from the
foreign country. Likewise, beginning from politically optimal policies, a small increase in foreign
trade taxes that is reciprocated by an increase in domestic trade taxes impacts foreign welfare





d￿ ]. But the bottom condition in (8) implies that W￿
P￿
dP￿
d￿ = 0 at
the political optimum. Hence, the foreign country cannot gain from a small tari⁄ increase that is
met by a reciprocal response from the domestic country.
Each of these observations holds as well when political-economy forces are present. Hence, the
terms-of-trade Prisoners￿Dilemma problem that characterizes the Nash ine¢ ciency in the model
with export-sector market power ￿like the competitive benchmark model ￿provides a foundation
for understanding why a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide
governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. We summarize with:
Corollary 1 In the model with export-sector monopoly power, and for governments with or without
political-economic preferences, the principle of reciprocity serves to ￿undo￿the terms-of-trade driven
restrictions in trade volume that occur when governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
3 Trade Policies and Pro￿t-Shifting
In the previous section, we considered import and export policies when market power exists on
one side of any trade. In this section, we consider two-sided market power. In particular, we
22To derive this expression, we recall that P and P
￿ are functions of ￿ (and hence t and t
￿), and we observe that
a reciprocal reduction in t and t





17analyze a model in which a single domestic ￿rm sells at home and abroad and competes in the
foreign market with a single foreign ￿rm which sells the same good. We thus now introduce the
possibility of international oligopoly competition. As before, we feature the case in which the
domestic and foreign markets are integrated. Firms then cannot price discriminate across the two
markets and any di⁄erence in prices across the two markets thus derives from trade policies. The
case of segmented markets is again considered in the Appendix.
3.1 Basic Assumptions
We extend the model of the previous section by now introducing a foreign ￿rm that competes for
sales with the domestic ￿rm according to Cournot competition. We continue to feature the case in
which markets are integrated, so that trade occurs in only one direction, and we assume that the
foreign ￿rm faces import competition from the domestic ￿rm for sales in the foreign market. With
the domestic ￿rm exporting to the foreign country, it follows that the relationship between P and
P￿ implied by market integration is again given by P￿ = P + ￿, where recall that ￿ represents the
total tari⁄ t+t￿ which we again assume to be non-prohibitive; and we again de￿ne the world price
as Pw = P + t = P￿ ￿ t￿. As before, we continue to represent domestic and foreign demands with
the downward-sloping and positive functions D(P) and D￿(P￿) respectively.
We begin by de￿ning the market-clearing condition in the integrated market. Suppose that
domestic and foreign tari⁄s are given as t and t￿, and suppose as well that the domestic ￿rm
produces q units of output while the foreign ￿rm￿ s output level is q￿. The industry output Q ￿ q+q￿
then determines P and thereby P￿ = P + ￿ through the (integrated) market-clearing condition
q + q￿ = D(P) + D￿(P + ￿): (12)
Using this market-clearing condition, we may de￿ne P(q+q￿;￿) or equivalently P(Q;￿) and thereby
represent the market-clearing domestic price as a function of the total output and tari⁄ levels,
respectively. Likewise, we may de￿ne the associated market-clearing foreign price as P￿(Q;￿) ￿
P(Q;￿)+￿. Given our assumption of downward-sloping demand functions, we can easily show that
P(Q;￿) is decreasing in both Q and the total tari⁄ ￿. Intuitively, when the total tari⁄ is raised,
the foreign price is directly elevated and aggregate demand (i.e., the right-hand side of (12)) is thus
reduced. Market-clearing can be restored only when P is lowered so that aggregate demand can
be expanded back to the original level. In the end, an increase in the total tari⁄ results in a lower
domestic price P, a higher foreign local price P￿ and a larger wedge between the two prices.
We next consider the optimal output choice for the domestic ￿rm. Facing domestic and foreign
tari⁄s t and t￿, the problem for the domestic ￿rm is to choose its output q to maximize its pro￿t
in light of the foreign ￿rm￿ s output choice q￿. Using the market-clearing condition, we may de￿ne
the domestic ￿rm￿ s pro￿t as:
￿(q;q￿;￿) = [P(q + q￿;￿) ￿ co]q:
18The ￿rst-order condition that de￿nes the domestic ￿rm￿ s optimal output choice equates the marginal




q + P(￿)] ￿ co = 0;
where we use P(￿) to denote P(q + q￿;￿) to reduce notation. The domestic-￿rm reaction function
is derived from this equation and indicates the pro￿t-maximizing quantity choice for the domestic
￿rm when the foreign ￿rm is expected to supply q￿ units and the total tari⁄ is ￿.23 Since P(￿) is
decreasing in Q, it thus follows that the markup for the domestic ￿rm is positive: P(￿) > co.
Similarly, for given tari⁄s t and t￿, the problem for the foreign ￿rm is to choose its output q￿
to maximize its pro￿t in light of the domestic ￿rm￿ s output choice q. The foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is:
￿￿(q;q￿;￿) = [P￿(q + q￿;￿) ￿ c￿
o]q￿:





q￿ + P￿(￿)] ￿ c￿
o = 0;
where we use P￿(￿) to denote P￿(q + q￿;￿) to reduce notation. The foreign-￿rm reaction function
is derived from this equation and indicates the pro￿t-maximizing quantity choice for the foreign
￿rm for given values of q and ￿.24 Since P￿(￿) is decreasing in Q, it thus follows that the markup
for the foreign ￿rm is also positive: P￿(￿) > c￿
o.
At the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game, the domestic and foreign ￿rms are on their
respective reaction curves. Let qN(￿) denote the Cournot-Nash output choice of the domestic ￿rm
and q￿N(￿) denote the Cournot-Nash output choice of the foreign ￿rm. We can then represent
the total output in the Cournot equilibrium as QN(￿) ￿ qN(￿) + q￿N(￿). From here, we may
de￿ne the Cournot-Nash prices as functions of the tari⁄s. Speci￿cally, let PN(￿) ￿ P(QN(￿);￿),
P￿N(￿) ￿ PN(￿)+￿, and PwN(t;t￿) ￿ PN(￿)+t = P￿N(￿)￿t￿ denote the Cournot-Nash domestic,
foreign and world price functions, respectively.
In this model, an increase in the total tari⁄results in a reduction in the market-clearing domestic
price. In turn, this reduction lowers the marginal revenue from output expansion for the domestic
￿rm. We thus expect that the domestic ￿rm￿ s reaction function may shift in as the total tari⁄
is raised.25 Similarly, an increase in the total tari⁄ results in an increase in the market-clearing
foreign price, which has the e⁄ect of raising the marginal revenue from output expansion for the
foreign ￿rm. On this basis, we expect that the foreign ￿rm￿ s reaction function may shift out when
the total tari⁄ is increased. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs at the quantities at which the
two reaction functions intersect. In light of the expected e⁄ects of the total tari⁄ on the respective
23We assume that the second-order condition holds.
24Once again we assume that the second-order condition holds.
25All of the properties described in this section hold, for example, if the domestic and foreign demand functions
are linear and model parameters are such that an exporting ￿rm sells in both markets.
19reaction functions, we anticipate that an increase in the total tari⁄ may cause qN(￿) to decrease
and q￿N(￿) to increase. Since markups are positive, such quantity adjustments may be interpreted
as shifting pro￿t from the domestic to the foreign ￿rm. The quantity adjustments are expected to
moderate but not reverse the price e⁄ects associated with a total tari⁄ increase; thus, we expect
that an increase in the total tari⁄would raise the Cournot-Nash foreign price, P￿N(￿), and decrease
the Cournot-Nash domestic price, PN(￿). In the discussion that follows, we assume that P￿N rises
and PN falls with the total tari⁄. Finally, note that our assumptions ensure that the world price,
PwN(t;t￿), rises with the export tari⁄ t and falls with the import tari⁄ t￿: a higher tari⁄ by one
country improves its own terms of trade and diminishes the terms of trade of its trading partner.26
3.2 Welfare Functions
To understand the welfare functions, we begin by considering an experiment in which t is increased
and t￿ is decreased to an equal degree so that the total tari⁄ ￿ is unchanged. With the total
tari⁄ held constant, the domestic and foreign respective Cournot-Nash outputs and local prices
are all also unchanged. The proposed change does, however, generate an improved terms of trade
for the domestic country and a diminished terms of trade for the foreign country. The terms-of-
trade movement in this scenario generates a pure rent transfer; in particular, the proposed tari⁄
adjustments have no e⁄ect other than to transfer tari⁄ revenue from the foreign treasury to the
domestic treasury. Clearly, all else equal, an improved terms of trade raises a country￿ s welfare.
We now examine the domestic welfare function in detail. In the integrated market, any wedge
between the foreign and domestic local prices is attributable to the total tari⁄. This property must
hold in particular at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium; thus, we have that ￿ = P￿N ￿ PN, where to
ease the notational burden we now suppress the dependence of the Cournot-Nash prices on the
total tari⁄. We next may write q￿N(￿) = q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN) and thereby express the foreign ￿rm￿ s
Cournot-Nash output as a function of the price wedge in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. At this
point, we can represent domestic welfare as
[PN￿co]D(PN)+CS(PN)+[P￿N￿(co+￿)][D￿(P￿N)￿q￿N(P￿N￿PN)]+t[D￿(P￿N)￿q￿N(P￿N￿PN)]:
The ￿rst two terms correspond to domestic producer and consumer surplus on domestically traded
units, the third term represents the (post-tari⁄) pro￿t to the domestic ￿rm on units sold abroad,
and the last term is the tari⁄ revenue retained by the domestic treasury on those exported units.
Since tari⁄revenue is simply an internal transfer within the domestic country, we may simplify and
represent domestic country welfare as
W(PN;P￿N;PwN) = [PN ￿co]D(PN)+CS(PN)+[PwN ￿co][D￿(P￿N)￿q￿N(P￿N ￿PN)]: (13)
26Helpman and Krugman (1989, Chapter 6) consider a model in which a single ￿rm produces but no consumers
demand the export good in the exporting country. Under Cournot competition, they argue that when a ￿rm also
produces the good in the importing country, it is more likely that a higher import tari⁄ results in a terms-of-trade
gain for the importing country than would be the case if there were no ￿rm in the importing country.
20The third term in (13) can now be understood as ￿true￿exporting pro￿t for the domestic country.
Domestic welfare depends on the foreign local price, P￿N. This is because the domestic ￿rm does
not simply ￿take￿the domestic local price but rather has some market power with respect to the
determination of domestic and foreign local prices. The resulting foreign local price a⁄ects the level
of domestic exports by a⁄ecting both the level of foreign demand and the level of foreign supply.




Foreign country welfare is thus the sum of foreign consumer surplus, foreign pro￿t and tari⁄revenue
enjoyed on imported units. Notice from (14) that now, due to the presence of the foreign duopolist,
foreign welfare depends not only on P￿N and PwN, but also on PN. The reason is analogous to
the reason that domestic welfare depends on P￿N when the domestic ￿rm exerts market power, as
we explain above.
3.3 Nash and E¢ cient Tari⁄s
In the absence of a trade agreement, governments would set their Nash tari⁄ policies, tN and t￿N.























where once again we use the fact that d￿
dt = 1 = d￿
dt￿. Thus, when setting its optimal trade policy,
each government is mindful of the e⁄ect of its policy on its own local price, the local price in the
other country, and its terms-of-trade.
To better understand these expressions, we consider ￿rst the government of the domestic coun-
try. If this government were to increase t and hence ￿, then the domestic price PN would fall as
domestic output is redirected to the domestic market. This price change has the bene￿cial e⁄ect
of diminishing the markup in the domestic market. A higher value for t also raises P￿N. Due to
the decrease in PN and the increase in P￿N, the price wedge, P￿N ￿ PN, must rise. This implies
in turn that the total output of the domestic ￿rm, qN(P￿N ￿PN), falls and the total output of the
foreign ￿rm, q￿N(P￿N ￿PN), rises. The higher foreign price also causes foreign demand, D￿(P￿N),
to fall. The domestic export volume, D￿(P￿N) ￿ q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN), is thus reduced, both because
foreign demand falls and because foreign production expands. In the foreign market, the increase
in t thus shifts some (true) pro￿t from the domestic to the foreign ￿rm, and this pro￿t-shifting
e⁄ect represents a cost to the domestic government of a higher value for t. Finally, when t is
increased, the world price, PwN, rises, and the domestic country enjoys a terms-of-trade gain. This
gain amounts to a transfer of tari⁄ revenue from the foreign treasury to the domestic treasury and
21represents a bene￿t to the domestic government from a higher value for t. Thus, when considering
whether to raise t, the domestic government balances the bene￿ts of a reduced domestic markup
and an improved terms of trade against the pro￿t-shifting cost in the foreign market.
In a similar manner, if the government of the foreign country were to increase its import tari⁄
t￿ and hence ￿, then P￿N would rise, PN would fall, and the price wedge would thus increase. The
increase in P￿N would cause a reduction in foreign demand, and this reduction would correspond to
a fall in import volume that is not fully o⁄set by a rise in production by the foreign ￿rm. The overall
reduction in volume corresponds to a higher foreign markup and represents a cost to the foreign
country that is experienced as a reduction in consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue. At the same
time, a higher import tari⁄ ensures that some of the lost import volume is replaced by an increase
in the production by the foreign ￿rm, and this pro￿t-shifting e⁄ect generates a gain for the foreign
government. Finally, a higher import tari⁄ causes a reduction in the world price. The associated
terms-of-trade gain for the foreign country amounts to a transfer from the domestic treasury to
the foreign treasury and represents a further gain to the foreign government from an increase in
its import tari⁄. Thus, when evaluating whether to raise its import tari⁄, the foreign government
balances the cost of a higher foreign markup against the pro￿t-shifting and terms-of-trade bene￿ts.
An e¢ cient or joint-welfare maximizing agreement would maximize the sum of W and W￿. As
before, the world price cancels from this summation: the world price a⁄ects the distribution of
rents across countries, but it does not in itself a⁄ect e¢ ciency. Intuitively, and as explained above,
when local prices are held ￿xed, an increase in the world price simply transfers tari⁄ revenue from
the foreign country to the domestic country. In order to e⁄ect a favorable transfer of this kind, a
government may select a higher tari⁄and thereby alter not just the world price but also local prices.
E¢ ciency is a⁄ected by local prices. Policies that are motivated by the prospect of a terms-of-trade
gain thus represent a source of ine¢ ciency.
But if governments were not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of their respective
policies, would there be any other sources of ine¢ ciency? To address this question, we express joint
welfare as
J(PN;P￿N) ￿ W(PN;P￿N;PwN) + W￿(P￿N;PN;PwN) (16)
= [PN ￿ co]D(PN) + CS(PN) + [P￿N ￿ co][D￿(P￿N) ￿ q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN)]
+CS￿(P￿N) + [P￿N ￿ c￿
o]q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN):
As (16) indicates, joint welfare can thus be understood as capturing domestic country producer
and consumer surplus on units sold domestically, domestic (pre-tax) producer surplus on units sold
abroad, foreign country consumer surplus enjoyed on units produced in both countries, and foreign
country producer surplus.
We provide next a formal characterization of the e¢ cient export and import tari⁄s. Recalling
that the world price cancels from the joint welfare expression, and that the local prices PN and
P￿N depend only on the tari⁄ sum ￿, it follows as before that e¢ ciency only ties down the sum of

















As before, e¢ ciency requires only that t and t￿ be chosen so that the total tari⁄ ￿ satis￿es (17).
We next con￿rm that the Nash tari⁄ choices are ine¢ cient. To this end, we add the two Nash






















where we use (13) and (14) to impose that WPwN = D￿(P￿N) ￿ q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN) = ￿W￿
PwN. The
inequality in (18) then follows from our assumption that PwN rises with t and falls with t￿. As-
suming that the second-order condition for joint-welfare maximization holds, we may now compare
(17) and (18) to conclude that the sum of Nash tari⁄s is higher than is e¢ cient. Consequently, in
the Nash equilibrium, the volume of trade (D￿(P￿N) ￿ q￿N(P￿N ￿ PN)) is lower than is e¢ cient.
3.4 Politically Optimal Tari⁄s and the Rationale for a Trade Agreement
Our next step is to consider the politically optimal tari⁄s, which we again de￿ne as the tari⁄s
that the domestic and foreign governments would choose unilaterally if they did not value the
pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their
unilateral tari⁄ choices. Speci￿cally, the domestic government acts as if WPwN ￿ 0 when choosing
its politically optimal tari⁄, while the foreign government acts as if W￿
PwN ￿ 0. Accordingly,

















As (19) indicates, when the domestic country determines its politically optimal tari⁄, it considers
the fact that a higher export tari⁄ would lower the local domestic price and thereby increase the
level of welfare that is associated with domestically sold units. At the same time, a higher export
tari⁄ would raise the total tari⁄ and thus the wedge between the domestic and foreign local prices.
This would reduce exports from the domestic country, with some of the lost sales being shifted
to the foreign ￿rm. Given positive markups, the reduction in export volume represents a pro￿t-
shifting cost to the domestic country of a higher export tari⁄. The politically optimal tari⁄achieves
a balance between these considerations. Similarly, for the foreign country, the politically optimal
import tari⁄balances the bene￿cial e⁄ect on pro￿t of greater production by the foreign ￿rm against
the negative e⁄ect on foreign tari⁄ revenue and consumer surplus of a lower volume of imports.
23As before, a simple comparison of the e¢ ciency conditions in (17) and the de￿nition of politically
optimal tari⁄s in (19) leads immediately to the conclusion that the politically optimal tari⁄s are
e¢ cient. In other words, if governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-
shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their tari⁄ choices, then they
would set e¢ cient tari⁄s and there would be nothing left for a trade agreement to do.
It is interesting to re￿ ect on the role of pro￿t shifting in this model. Certainly, when markups
are positive and one government undertakes a policy that has the e⁄ect of raising the output of
￿rms from its country while lowering the output of ￿rms from a di⁄erent country, then pro￿t may
be shifted from the latter country to the former country. Such pro￿t shifting in itself represents
a bene￿t to one country and a loss to the other. In the model studied here, the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium output levels are functions of the total tari⁄, which in turn equals the wedge between
the local price in the importing country and that in the exporting country. In short, pro￿t-shifting
is triggered by adjustments in local prices. Thus, as a general matter, there exist local-price
international externalities that are associated with pro￿t shifting. We note further that local-price
adjustments do not generate pure (i.e., zero-sum) transfers from one country to another; rather,
they a⁄ect trade volumes and thereby consumer surplus, tari⁄ revenue and pro￿t.
Let us now recall that each government has a trade policy instrument with which to a⁄ect
local prices and achieve a balance between bene￿ts and costs. In particular, if it were the case
that governments did not value the terms-of-trade consequences of their trade policies, then each
government would set its unilateral policy so that any induced movement in local prices would
o⁄er no ￿rst-order bene￿t to its country￿ s welfare. At the associated political optimum, therefore,
each government would have already set its policy so that the local price changes necessary to
generate any pro￿t-shifting bene￿t would generate other o⁄setting welfare costs. At this point,
any international externality that travels through local prices would be removed, and the resulting
politically optimal tari⁄s are therefore e¢ cient.
As before, the model can be generalized. In addition to an analysis of segmented markets which
we provide in the Appendix, we can include a second (mirror-image) good x, which the foreign
country exports to the domestic country. We can also allow that governments have political-
economic objectives and value producer surplus more heavily than consumer surplus and tari⁄
revenue. As in the previous section, these extensions do not alter our basic conclusion.
We summarize the results of this section as follows:
Proposition 2 In the duopoly pro￿t-shifting model, and for governments with or without political-
economic preferences, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient terms-
of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume.
3.5 Reciprocity
Like Proposition 1 for the model with export-sector market power, Proposition 2 carries with it an
important implication: in the duopoly pro￿t-shifting model, just as in the competitive benchmark
24model, a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide governments
from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. This implication can be established
with identical steps to those taken in the context of the model with export-sector market power
that we analyze in the previous section.
Speci￿cally, we may consider a 3-good general-equilibrium interpretation of the duopoly pro￿t-
shifting model, where good y is exported from the domestic country to the foreign country as above,
good x is a mirror-image good that is exported in the opposite direction, and the third good is
a traded numeraire good. Using identical arguments to those described in the previous section,
we may establish that tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity as de￿ned in (11) can be equated
with tari⁄ changes that leave world prices unaltered. But this means that starting at the Nash
equilibrium, the domestic and foreign countries must both gain from a small reduction in trade
taxes that satis￿es reciprocity.27 Moreover, if countries negotiate to the political optimum, then
neither country has an interest in unilaterally raising its trade tax if it is understood that such an
act would be met with a reciprocal action from its trading partner.28 Each of these observations
holds as well when political-economy forces are present.
Hence, the terms-of-trade Prisoners￿Dilemma problem that characterizes the Nash ine¢ ciency
in the duopoly pro￿t-shifting model ￿like the competitive benchmark model ￿provides a foundation
for understanding why a trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide
governments from their ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. We summarize this
discussion as follows:
Corollary 2 In the duopoly pro￿t-shifting model, and for governments with or without political-
economic preferences, the principle of reciprocity serves to ￿undo￿ the terms-of-trade driven re-
strictions in trade volume that occur when governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
27To see why, recall that tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity leave world prices unaltered. This means
that, beginning from Nash policies, a small reduction in domestic trade taxes that is reciprocated by a reduction
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d￿ ] > 0 at the Nash
policies. We thus conclude that the domestic country must gain from a small amount of trade liberalization that
conforms to reciprocity. Similarly, if we begin at Nash policies and consider a small reduction in foreign trade











d￿ ], where the ￿rst term in brackets is positive under our assumptions. We
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d￿ ] > 0 at the Nash policies. Thus, the foreign country must also gain
from a small amount of trade liberalization that conforms to reciprocity.
28To con￿rm this observation, let us begin at the politically optimal policies. A small increase in domes-












d￿ = 0. Thus, the domestic country cannot gain from a small tari⁄ increase that is met by a
reciprocal response from the foreign country. Likewise, beginning from politically optimal policies, a small increase



















d￿ = 0 at
the political optimum. Hence, the foreign country cannot gain from a small tari⁄ increase that is met by a reciprocal
response from the domestic country.
254 Strategic Export Policies in Third-Country Models
We now consider the role of a trade agreement in a ￿third-country model,￿in which exporters are
located in each of two countries, and all consumption occurs in a third country. With all consumers
located in one market, we can put to the side any discussion of segmented markets. The third-
country model is useful as a simple setting within which to consider the role of strategic export
policies when exporters from di⁄erent countries compete.
4.1 Basic Assumptions
We suppose that country A has a single exporter, ￿rm A, and likewise country B has a single
exporter, ￿rm B. All consumers reside in country C. Firms A and B compete for sales to consumers
in country C, and we assume that this competition takes the form of Cournot competition. The
government of country A (i.e., government A) has available a speci￿c export tari⁄, tA, where a
negative value indicates an export subsidy; and similarly government B has available a speci￿c
export tari⁄, tB. We allow as well that government C has available an import policy, where tA
C and
tB
C represent the possibly discriminatory speci￿c import tari⁄s that country C applies to imports
from countries A and B, respectively.
We denote local prices in the three countries as PA, PB and PC, where the former two prices
are the respective export prices and the latter price is the price at which consumption occurs. We
represent the demand function in country C as D(PC), and as above we assume that this function
is downward sloping and positive. Along any channel of trade, any di⁄erence between export
and consumption prices is attributable to the trade taxes imposed along that channel. De￿ning
￿A ￿ tA + tA
C and ￿B ￿ tB + tB
C, we thus have PC ￿ PA = ￿A and PC ￿ PB = ￿B. Letting qA
and qB denote the respective output choices of ￿rms A and B, we may express the market-clearing
condition as D(PC) = qA + qB. We may thus represent the market-clearing price in country C as
a downward-sloping function, PC(qA + qB).
For given trade policies, ￿rms A and B choose their respective pro￿t-maximizing outputs. Let
co denote the common marginal cost of production for ￿rms A and B. When ￿rm A conjectures
that ￿rm B￿ s output choice is qB, ￿rm A￿ s best response is the output level qA that maximizes
[PC(qA + qB) ￿ co ￿ ￿A]qA:
The resulting best-response or reaction function is represented as qR
A(qB;￿A). Likewise, when ￿rm
B conjectures that ￿rm A￿ s output is qA, ￿rm B￿ s best response is the output qB that maximizes
[PC(qA + qB) ￿ co ￿ ￿B]qB.
Firm B￿ s reaction function is denoted qR
B(qA;￿B).29 As in previous sections, the ￿rst-order condi-
tions for pro￿t-maximization ensure that the resulting price exceeds the marginal cost of production
29We assume that the ￿rms￿respective second-order conditions are satis￿ed.
26plus the total tari⁄ that a ￿rm faces.
Under general conditions, a ￿rm￿ s best response is reduced when it faces a higher total tari⁄;
thus, if we depict a ￿rm￿ s reaction function on a graph with axes for qA and qB, then a ￿rm￿ s
reaction function shifts in when the total tari⁄ that it faces increases. For a large set of demand
functions, including linear demand functions, a ￿rm￿ s reaction function is also decreasing in the
output that it conjectures for the rival ￿rm. Quantities are then said to be ￿strategic substitutes,￿
and we focus on this case in what follows.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a pair of quantities, qN
A(￿A;￿B) and qN
B(￿A;￿B), at which
the reaction functions intersect. We assume the existence of a unique and stable Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.30 Each ￿rm￿ s Cournot-Nash quantity is then decreasing in the total tari⁄ that it
confronts and increasing in the total tari⁄ that its rival confronts. For example, if the total tari⁄
￿A that ￿rm A confronts were to rise, then ￿rm A would face a higher marginal cost of delivering
its product to consumers in country C, and ￿rm A￿ s reaction function would shift in. Given that
reaction functions are negatively sloped, the new Cournot-Nash equilibrium would entail lower
output by ￿rm A and greater output by ￿rm B. Similarly, if ￿rm A were to face a lower total tari⁄,
then the new equilibrium would entail higher output from ￿rm A and lower output from ￿rm B.
In particular, if government A were to move from free trade to an export subsidy (tA < 0), then
￿rm A￿ s output would increase while ￿rm B￿ s output would fall. In e⁄ect, as we discuss in more
detail below, an export subsidy then shifts pro￿t from country B to country A.
The total Cournot-Nash output is denoted as QN(￿A;￿B) ￿ qN
A(￿A;￿B) + qN
B(￿A;￿B). Under
our stability assumption, total output falls when the total tari⁄ along any channel rises. Thus, QN
is decreasing in ￿A and ￿B. Intuitively, when the total tari⁄ ￿A that ￿rm A confronts rises, the
￿direct￿e⁄ect of a reduction in ￿rm A￿ s output is larger than the ￿indirect￿e⁄ect of an induced
expansion in ￿rm B￿ s output. Consequently, if we let the Cournot-Nash price be denoted as
PN
C (￿A;￿B) = PC(QN(￿A;￿B)), then we may conclude that PN
C is increasing in ￿A and ￿B. Given
our focus on the case of strategic substitutes, we also ￿nd that PN
C rises by less than a dollar when
the total tari⁄ on a given trade channel is increased by a dollar: @PN
C =@￿A < 1 and @PN
C =@￿B < 1.
We now express the local prices in countries A and B as functions of the respective total
tari⁄s. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the local prices in countries A and B can be expressed
as functions of ￿A and ￿B in the following respective manners:
PN
A (￿A;￿B) = PN
C (￿A;￿B) ￿ ￿A; and
PN
B (￿A;￿B) = PN
C (￿A;￿B) ￿ ￿B.
The local price in country A decreases as ￿A rises, since the associated rise in the price in country
C is not one-for-one. Similarly, an increase in ￿B results in a decrease in the local price in country
B. Finally, an increase in ￿A raises the local price in country C and thereby also raises the local
price in country B; an analogous e⁄ect extends to the local price in country A when ￿B is raised.
30On a graph with qA on the y axis and qB on the x axis, stability means that ￿rm B￿ s reaction function is steeper
than is ￿rm A￿ s reaction function.
27We next de￿ne and characterize the world prices. Since country C may set discriminatory
import tari⁄s, we must allow for di⁄erent world prices across di⁄erent trade channels. Accordingly,





C (￿A;￿B) ￿ tA
C = PN
A (￿A;￿B) + tA:





C (￿A;￿B) ￿ tB
C = PN
B (￿A;￿B) + tB:









C. We may think of PwN
A as
country A￿ s terms of trade, and similarly we may regard PwN
B as country B￿ s terms of trade.
Country C experiences an improvement in its bilateral terms of trade with country A when PwN
A
falls, and it likewise experiences an improvement in its bilateral terms of trade with country B
when PwN
B falls. We de￿ne a measure of country C￿ s multilateral terms of trade below.
As discussed above, an increase in the total tari⁄ along a channel of trade is only partially
passed through as an increase in the price of the good in country C; thus, when government C




C) is decreasing in tA
C, and similarly PwN
B (tA;tA
C;tB;tB
C) is decreasing in tB
C. This
means that country C enjoys a bilateral terms-of-trade gain along any channel on which it raises
the import tari⁄, while the trading partner along this channel experiences a terms-of-trade loss.
On the other hand, if country A raises its export tari⁄ tA, then PN








exporting country can improve its own terms of trade by raising its export tari⁄. A higher export
tari⁄, however, results in a bilateral terms-of-trade loss for country C. Finally, it is interesting to
observe that a higher export tari⁄by one exporting country raises PN
C and thus improves the terms
of trade for the other exporting country as well.
Our next step is to show that the Cournot-Nash quantities may also be expressed as functions
of local prices. To this end, we begin with the observation that the total tari⁄ along any channel
equals the di⁄erence between the local prices in the importing and exporting countries. Thus,
￿A = PN
C ￿ PN
A and ￿B = PN
C ￿ PN
B . We may thus represent the Cournot-Nash quantities for















B ). Thus, equilibrium quantities are
ultimately determined by the respective total tari⁄s along each channel, but any total tari⁄itself is
equal to the local-price wedge along the associated channel. We can therefore think of government
A, for example, choosing its export tari⁄ tA with the view that its choice will alter ￿ and hence
the local-price di⁄erence between countries A and C, and thereby alter the quantities produced by
￿rms A and B. For instance, if government A moves from free trade to an export subsidy, then this
change leads to a decrease in PN
C and thereby PN
B and an increase in PN
A . The resulting decrease in
28PN
C ￿ PN
A corresponds exactly to the decrease in tA (and ￿) and results in a higher level of output
from ￿rm A. For ￿rm B, however, the reduction in PN
C ￿PN
A causes a decrease in its Cournot-Nash
output, since as discussed qN
B is increasing in its ￿rst argument. An important implication of this
discussion, therefore, is that the pro￿t-shifting e⁄ect associated with a unilateral export subsidy
can be understood as operating through movements in local prices. In this sense, the incentive to
shift pro￿ts operates independently of any motivation to manipulate the terms of trade.
4.2 Welfare Functions
We next consider government welfare functions. We assume that each government maximizes
national welfare. For country A, national welfare may be represented as
[PN
C ￿ (co + ￿A)]qN
A + tAqN
A = [PN
C ￿ (co + tA
C)]qN
A:
Thus, national welfare for country A is the sum of the (post-tari⁄) pro￿t earned by ￿rm A and the
tari⁄ revenue generated by the export tari⁄ tA. The associated tari⁄ revenue, however, amounts
to a transfer from the pro￿t of ￿rm A to country A￿ s treasury. Such a transfer is welfare neutral.
This accounts for the manner in which the welfare expression is simpli￿ed in the equation above.
National welfare for country B may be represented in a similar manner.
For our purposes, it is most useful to represent government welfares as functions of local and
















Thus, country A￿ s national welfare corresponds to a measure of its true pro￿t. Likewise, country



































Thus, country C welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and the tari⁄ revenue received from each
bilateral trading relationship.
With the welfare functions represented in this way, we can identify the precise paths through
which externalities are transmitted across countries. Suppose, for example, that government A con-
templates a move from free trade to an export subsidy. In the resulting Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
the export subsidy would lower PN
C ￿PN
A and thereby increase ￿rm A￿ s production. For a ￿xed and
29positive true markup, PwN
A ￿ co, an expansion in ￿rm A￿ s output would be bene￿cial to country
A. But an export subsidy also serves to lower PwN
A and thus the true markup. Government A
must thus weigh markup and volume trade-o⁄s when setting its optimal export policy. The export
subsidy increases ￿rm A￿ s output in part because of a strategic e⁄ect: the export subsidy lowers
PN
C ￿PN
A and thereby decreases ￿rm B￿ s Cournot-Nash output. Country B loses from this output
reduction, for a ￿xed and positive true markup, PwN
B ￿ co. An export subsidy from government A
also lowers country B￿ s true markup, since it lowers PN
C and thus PwN
B . Finally, for country C, the
induced changes in local prices a⁄ect consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue. Clearly, the reduction
in PwN
A which country A regards as a cost represents a bene￿t to country C.
4.3 Nash and E¢ cient Tari⁄s
When a trade agreement is not in place, governments select their policies unilaterally, and a Nash





Given the symmetric structure of the model and under appropriate concavity conditions, the unique
Nash equilibrium is symmetric. We thus assume here that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and
focus on that equilibrium in what follows. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, governments A and B
adopt the same export policies, tN
A = tN
B, and government C￿ s optimal import policy is symmetric
as well, tAN
C = tBN
C . Thus, one implication of our symmetric model is that government C￿ s import
policy respects the principle of non-discrimination in the Nash equilibrium. Consequently, world
prices in the Nash equilibrium do not di⁄er across trade channels: PwN
A = PwN
B .
Using the symmetric structure of the model and noting that d￿A
dtA = 1 = d￿A
dtC
A















































The ￿rst equation in (23) gives the ￿rst-order condition for government A￿ s selection of its import
tari⁄, tA. As the equation con￿rms, and as discussed above, government A is mindful of the e⁄ect of
its import tari⁄ on local prices and its terms of trade, PwN
A . The second equation in (23) provides
the ￿rst-order condition for government C￿ s selection of the import tari⁄, tA
C, that it applies to
exports from country A. Government C is mindful of the e⁄ect of its import tari⁄ on local prices
and its bilateral terms of trade, PwN
A and PwN
B .


































30where the corresponding Nash ￿rst-order conditions for tB and tB
C are exactly symmetric.
We now characterize the Nash trade policies. We begin by considering the ￿rst condition in
(24). Under the assumptions presented above, we have that @qN
A=@￿A < 0 < @PwN
A =@tA. With
qN
A > 0 at the Nash trade policies, we thus conclude from this ￿rst condition that PwN
A = PwN
B > co.




B at the Nash trade
















] = 0; (25)
where @QN=@￿A < 0 under the assumptions presented above. We now strengthen our assumptions
slightly and assume that, starting at the Nash equilibrium, PwN
A +PwN
B decreases when tA
C is raised.
Under this assumption, when governments start at the Nash equilibrium, if government C were to
raise slightly the tari⁄that it applies to goods imported from country A, then the direct e⁄ect of its
bilateral terms-of-trade gain on its trading relationship with country A would dominate the indirect
e⁄ect of its bilateral terms-of-trade loss on its trading relationship with country B. Intuitively, and
as we con￿rm below when we de￿ne country C￿ s multilateral terms of trade for general tari⁄s, this
assumption ensures that country A enjoys an overall terms-of-trade gain when it slightly increases




B at the Nash trade policies. Combining our ￿ndings, we have thus now
established that PN
C > co at the Nash trade policies.
We next characterize the joint welfare of the three governments. Using the welfare expressions
(20)-(22) presented above, we see that joint welfare, de￿ned as WA + WB + WC, is independent
of the world prices, PwN
A and PwN
A . Since the Nash trade policies are motivated by world-price
considerations, we thus have an immediate perspective regarding the ine¢ ciency of Nash trade



















where we utilize our observation that joint welfare is independent of world prices and represent J

















B ) + CS(PN
C ):
Joint welfare is thus joint pro￿t and consumer surplus, when the markup is evaluated as if all
producers pay no taxes and receive the ￿nal good price in country C.
We characterize next the e¢ cient trade policies. These are the policies that maximize joint
welfare. An immediate observation is that joint welfare depends only on the total tari⁄ along each
31trade channel. This follows since all local prices depend on total tari⁄s. We are thus led to evaluate
the derivative of J with respect to the total tari⁄ along each channel of trade. For simplicity, we
focus on e¢ cient policies in which both ￿rms produce. Using (27), we ￿nd after some manipulation



























@￿B = 0: (29)
Recalling that @QN=@￿A < 0 and @QN=@￿B < 0 hold under our assumptions, we may conclude
from (28) and (29) that PN
C = co at any set of e¢ cient tari⁄s.
E¢ ciency can be achieved when a symmetric total tari⁄ is used along each trade channel. The
e¢ cient total tari⁄ then entails a subsidy: ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿E where ￿E < 0 is determined so that
PN
C (￿E;￿E) = co.31 Thus, a continuum of e¢ cient trade policies exists, even when the total tari⁄
is symmetric across trade channels. In total, the ￿rms are subsidized to such an extent that the
price paid by ￿nal consumers equals the price that would have obtained in a free-trade setting with
perfect (or Bertrand) competition. As one example of an e¢ cient policy vector, country C might
adopt an import policy of free trade while countries B and C both adopt export subsidies at the
level tA = tB ￿ ￿E.
We now compare Nash and e¢ cient policies. As we argue above, when trade policies are set
at their Nash levels, the local price in country C exceeds the marginal cost of production, co. By
contrast, when trade policies are set in an e¢ cient manner, the local price in country C equals co.
Since the demand curve in country C is downward sloping, it follows immediately that the volume
of trade in the Nash equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low. In other words, the total tari⁄ is ine¢ ciently
high in the absence of a trade agreement.
4.4 Politically Optimal Tari⁄s and the Rationale for a Trade Agreement
We next identify the reason that the Nash tari⁄s are too high. To this end, we consider the
politically optimal tari⁄ policies. For simplicity, we focus on politically optimal tari⁄s in which
both ￿rms have positive production.
Consider ￿rst government A. When government A selects its politically optimal export policy,
it places no value on welfare changes that are attributable to a change in world prices. We thus
represent the ￿rst-order condition for the determination of government A￿ s politically optimal













@￿A = 0; (30)
31Consistent with our discussion of ￿rst-order conditions for quantity choices above, we assume that demand and
costs are such that P
N
C (0;0) > co:
32where the ￿rst equality follows after some manipulation. Using (30), we thus conclude that, in a
political optimum, PwN
A = co. We note that, when choosing its politically optimal tari⁄ policy,
government A is mindful of the e⁄ect of its policy on ￿rm A￿ s resulting Cournot-Nash output
quantity. Thus, pro￿t-shifting objectives are subsumed within the concept of a political optimum.
An analogous calculation applies for government B. In particular, the ￿rst-order condition for













@￿B = 0: (31)
Arguing as above, we may thus use (31) to conclude that, in a political optimum, PwN
B = co.
We come now to government C. For this government, a change in trade policy is attractive as
a means of pure rent shifting if it alters PwN
A and/or PwN
B while keeping PN
C and thus the overall
level of imports constant. In addition, for a given overall level of imports, if government C uses
its trade policy to alter local prices so as to change the respective export shares of ￿rms A and B,
then pure rent is gained when the share is increased on the channel on which government C has
the highest import tari⁄. Of course, this latter source of rent shifting does not arise if government
C adopts an MFN tari⁄ policy and sets the same tari⁄ on both channels. Given that we allow for
discriminatory tari⁄s, we are thus led to consider a de￿nition of the multilateral terms of trade for
country C which would include these various forms of rent shifting. With such a de￿nition in place,
we could then de￿ne government C￿ s politically optimal trade policy as the pair of import tari⁄s
that maximizes country C￿ s welfare when the incentive for government C to shift rents by altering
country C￿ s multilateral terms of trade is removed.




























Thus, TN is a trade-weighted average of bilateral world prices. Using this de￿nition, we can say
that country C experiences a multilateral terms-of-trade gain whenever TN falls. This de￿nition
absorbs the various notions of pure rent shifting just mentioned. If the world price falls along
either channel while local prices are held constant, so that country C enjoys a bilateral terms-of-
trade improvement, then TN falls and country C thus also enjoys a multilateral terms-of-trade
improvement. Next, suppose that government C imposes a higher import tari⁄ on imports from
country A, so that tA
C > tB
C and thus PwN
A < PwN
B . If government C were to use its trade policies so
as to alter local prices in countries A and B in a way that maintained the overall import quantity
QN while raising qN
A and lowering qN
B, then country C would experience a pure rent transfer in the
form of higher tari⁄ revenue. Given our de￿nition of TN, we see that such a maneuver results in a
lower value for TN and thus an improvement in country C￿ s multilateral terms of trade.
We now pause to consider the e⁄ect of an increase in tA
C on country C￿ s multilateral terms of













Thus, starting at the Nash equilibrium, if PwN
A +PwN
A decreases when tA
C is slightly increased, then
TN falls. Accordingly, the assumption made above in our analysis of (25) indeed can be interpreted
as an assumption that country C improves its multilateral terms of trade when it slightly increases
one import tari⁄ above the Nash level.
With a de￿nition for country C￿ s multilateral terms of trade now in hand, we may modify (22)


































where we abuse notation slightly and now present WC as a function of four arguments. If government
C were to ignore the pure rent-shifting e⁄ects of its trade policies, then it would act ￿as if￿ @WC
@TN ￿
0 when setting its policies. The resulting trade policies would then represent government C￿ s
politically optimal tari⁄s. Before proceeding, we observe from (32) that TN = PwN
A = PwN
B
when government C￿ s import tari⁄s satisfy MFN. Thus, in the case of MFN tari⁄s, government C
simply ignores welfare changes induced by changes in the (common) world price when setting its
politically optimal tari⁄s. When government C uses MFN import tari⁄s, therefore, its politically
optimal tari⁄s are de￿ned in a manner that is exactly analogous to the de￿nitions of politically
optimal tari⁄s used above for governments A and B.
We are now prepared to present the ￿rst-order conditions that determine country C￿ s politically









@￿A ] = [PN
C ￿ TN]
@QN










@￿B ] = [PN
C ￿ TN]
@QN
@￿B = 0; (35)
where the simpli￿ed expressions follow after some manipulation. Referring to (34) and (35), we thus
see that government C￿ s politically optimal tari⁄s are realized when they are set so that PN
C = TN.
Using (32), we next observe that PN







B = 0: (36)
34We observe from (36) that government C￿ s political optimality requirement is achieved if it practices




We next establish that any politically optimal tari⁄ policy vector in which ￿rms A and B
both produce positive quantities must be e¢ cient. Using (30) and (31), the political optimality
conditions for governments A and B then are expressed as
PwN
A = co = PwN
B : (37)
Using (36) and (37), the political optimality condition for government C becomes
PN
C = co: (38)
To complete the argument, we recall from above that (38) is also the condition that de￿nes an
e¢ cient trade volume.
Our next task is to construct a politically optimal tari⁄vector that generates the prices required
by (37) and (38). We observe ￿rst that PN
C = PwN
A = PwN
B holds if and only if government C
adopts a policy of free trade: tA
C = tB
C = 0. Next, we observe that the local price in country C
can be driven down to the cost of production when a symmetric total tari⁄ is used that entails a
subsidy: ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿E where ￿E < 0 is determined so that PN
C (￿E;￿E) = c0. Given tA
C = tB
C = 0,
we conclude that a political optimum exists in which government C adopts a policy of free trade
whereas governments A and B each adopt an export subsidy such that tA = tB ￿ ￿E < 0. The
constructed politically optimal tari⁄ vector is necessarily e¢ cient, and, indeed, we use exactly this
policy vector above as an example of an e¢ cient policy vector.
In sum, if governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-shifting as-
sociated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their tari⁄ choices, then they would set
e¢ cient tari⁄s and there would be nothing left for a trade agreement to do. We thus again conclude
that a rationale for a trade agreement arises if and only if governments are motivated by the terms-
of-trade implications of their trade policies. As in the previous sections, our basic conclusion is also
robust to an extension of the model in which governments have political-economic objectives. We
thus now summarize as follows:
Proposition 3 In the third-country model of strategic export policies, and for governments with
or without political-economic preferences, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the
ine¢ cient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume.
4.5 Reciprocity and Non-discrimination
As with Propositions 2 and 1 before it, an important implication of Proposition 3 is that, for the
third-country model of strategic export policies, just as in the competitive benchmark model, a
trade agreement that is founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide governments from their
ine¢ cient unilateral policies to the e¢ ciency frontier. Moreover, the 3-country feature of the third-
35country model permits an additional link to be forged with the competitive benchmark model:
for both models, in a many-country world the attractive features of the principle of reciprocity
obtain only when reciprocity is combined with the principle of non-discrimination (MFN). And so
in the third-country model of strategic export policies, the dual principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination can be seen as simple rules that together aid countries in their e⁄ort to negotiate
an escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners￿Dilemma.
To establish these implications, we again follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) and de￿ne
tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity as those that bring about equal changes in the volume of
each country￿ s imports and exports when valued at existing world prices. However, we now work
within a 4-good general-equilibrium interpretation of the third-country model, in which (i) each
of the three countries A, B and C is now the sole consumer of a good ￿a, b and c respectively ￿
which is supplied by competing exporters from the other two countries, and (ii) a fourth numeraire
good is freely traded among the three countries. For any non-numeraire good i, we denote by qi
j
the quantity of good i supplied by country j￿ s ￿rm. The demand for good i in country j is then
denoted as Di
j, where Di
j ￿ 0 for all j 6= i.
When each country￿ s import tari⁄ satis￿es MFN, the set of trade taxes may be denoted by
ti













C). Taking account of trade in
the numeraire good, and letting a superscript ￿0￿denote magnitudes evaluated at original trade
tax levels and a superscript ￿1￿denote magnitudes evaluated at new trade tax levels, it can be































According to (39), tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity and MFN imply either that (i) all
world prices are left unchanged as a result of the tari⁄ changes, or (ii) world prices are altered in
a net-revenue neutral fashion, so that there exists an alternative set of tari⁄ changes which would
preserve all local prices at their new levels but restore all world prices to their original levels, and
which would therefore leave each country indi⁄erent between the original tari⁄ changes and this
alternative.32 Either way, it is clear that there can be no pure international rent shifting across
countries as a result of tari⁄ changes that conform to MFN and reciprocity. And it is also clear
that we can again, henceforth and without loss of generality, equate tari⁄ changes that conform to
MFN and reciprocity with tari⁄ changes that leave world prices unaltered.
Several observations now follow. First, starting at the (MFN) Nash equilibrium, all countries
must gain from a small reduction in the level of their trade taxes that satis￿es MFN and reci-
procity.33 Second, if countries negotiate to the political optimum, then no country has an interest
32Point (ii) can be con￿rmed with the same steps as those described in note 20.
33To see why, consider the Nash MFN import tari⁄ that country C places on good c, which is de￿ned by the
36in unilaterally raising its MFN trade taxes if it is understood that such an act would be met with a
reciprocal MFN action from its trading partners.34 And third, a bilateral negotiation between any
two countries which conforms to reciprocity and satis￿es MFN insulates the third country from the
e⁄ects of this negotiation: hence reciprocity and MFN together insure against third-party e⁄ects
of bilateral trade liberalization.35 Finally, it can be shown that each of these features requires
that reciprocal tari⁄ changes conform to MFN: neither reciprocity nor MFN without the other can
deliver these points.36
Each of these observations holds as well when political-economy forces are present. Hence, the
terms-of-trade Prisoners￿Dilemma problem that characterizes the Nash ine¢ ciency in the third-
country model of strategic export policies ￿like the competitive benchmark model ￿provides a
foundation for understanding why a trade agreement that is founded on the principles of reciprocity























@tC = 0, where for notational ease we represent
country C￿ s MFN import tari⁄ on good c as tC and we suppress the good-c subscript on all prices. Recalling
that tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity and MFN leave world prices unaltered, this means that, beginning
from Nash policies, a small reduction in C￿ s MFN import tari⁄ that is reciprocated by a reduction in the export













































dtC ] > 0 at the Nash policies. We thus
conclude that country C must gain from a small amount of import trade liberalization that conforms to reciprocity
and MFN. Similar arguments hold for each other trade policy and each other country.
34To con￿rm this observation, let us focus on the MFN import tari⁄that country C places on good c and employ the
same notational simpli￿cations as in the previous footnote . In general, and recalling that tari⁄ changes that conform
to reciprocity and MFN leave world prices unaltered, a small increase in C￿ s MFN import tari⁄that is reciprocated by






































dtC = 0. We thus conclude
that, beginning from the political optimum, country C cannot gain from a small MFN tari⁄ increase that is met by
a reciprocal response from countries A and/or B. Similar arguments hold for each other trade policy and each other
country.
35To see this, consider the impact on Country A￿ s welfare when Country B and C engage in a reciprocal tar-



















B ), where for notational ease we again suppress the
good-c notation. Recalling that tari⁄ changes that conform to reciprocity and MFN leave world prices unaltered, a
bilateral negotiation between B and C that conforms to reciprocity and MFN will therefore leave A￿ s welfare unaf-










B ) is unaltered by this negotiation. Recalling now that q
N
A is decreasing in
its ￿rst argument and increasing in its second argument, it is clear that a bilateral negotiation between B and C that
conforms to MFN and leads to a drop in P
N
C combined with an appropriate increase in P
N
B could expand trade in
good c between B and C while keeping q
N
A unchanged. But in fact, it is straightforward to show that the changes in tC
and tB that are required to keep q
N
A unchanged are precisely those that hold the world price P
wN ￿xed and thereby
satisfy reciprocity. Finally, we note that the ability of reciprocity and MFN to jointly insure against third-party
e⁄ects of trade liberalization is not complete: as in the competitive benchmark setting, there can arise circumstances
in which two countries can use a bilateral negotiation which conforms to reciprocity and MFN to nevertheless alter
local prices in a way that bene￿ts them at the expense of the third country. However, the circumstances under which
this is possible are quite limited (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, Appendix to Ch. 5), and in any event apply equally
to the competitive benchmark setting and the setting we evaluate here, and so we do not emphasize them in our
discussion above.
36That these features break down when tari⁄ changes need only conform to either MFN or reciprocity separately
has been established in a competitive setting in Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2005). Analogous arguments can
be extended to the present setting and establish that the same breakdown occurs here.
37the e¢ ciency frontier. We summarize this discussion as follows:
Corollary 3 In the third-country model of strategic export policies, and for governments with or
without political-economic preferences, the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN)
serve to ￿undo￿the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume that occur when governments
pursue unilateral trade policies.
5 Conclusion
When markets are imperfectly competitive, trade policies can alter the terms of trade, shift pro￿ts
from one country to another, and moderate or exacerbate existing distortions that are associated
with the presence of monopoly power. In light of the various ways in which trade policies may
in￿ uence welfare, it might be expected that new rationales for trade agreements would arise once
imperfectly competitive markets are allowed. In this paper, we consider a sequence of trade mod-
els that feature imperfectly competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade
agreement is, in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In all of the
models that we consider, and whether or not governments have political-economic objectives, the
only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ cient terms-of-trade driven restrictions
in trade volume.
Having identi￿ed the problem that a trade agreement might solve, we are able to proceed to the
next step and evaluate the form that an e¢ ciency-enhancing trade agreement might take. Here,
too, our results parallel the results established previously for models with perfectly competitive
markets. In particular, we show that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN)
are e¢ ciency-enhancing, as they serve to ￿undo￿ the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade
volume that occur when governments pursue unilateral trade policies.
Our analysis thus suggests that the implications of the terms-of-trade approach to trade agree-
ments are quite general, as they apply not just to perfectly competitive but also to a wide range
of imperfectly competitive markets. This suggestion is further supported in our companion paper
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2009), which draws analogous conclusions in an imperfectly competitive set-
ting where the number of ￿rms is endogenous and ￿rm-delocation e⁄ects are featured. Nevertheless,
in all of the settings that we consider the international externalities share an important trait: they
all travel through prices, and are hence pecuniary in nature. Whether our results can be extended
to environments in which the key international externalities under consideration are non-pecuniary
￿and hence can shed light on the form that an e¢ ciency-enhancing agreement meant to address
such problems might take ￿is an important question that we leave for future research.37
37An additional feature which is common to the settings we consider is that international prices and the quantities
traded are ultimately determined by market-clearing mechanisms between (possibly non-competitive) suppliers and
consumers. Antras and Staiger (2008) show that, when trade re￿ ects specialized products whose international prices
are determined through bilateral bargaining between sellers and buyers rather than market clearing mechanisms, the
role of a trade agreement must expand beyond providing an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners￿
Dilemma if governments are to achieve the international e¢ ciency frontier.
38Appendix to Section 2
Our consideration of export-sector market power in Section 2 focused on integrated markets. We now relax
this assumption and consider the possibility that the export monopolist can segment the domestic and foreign
markets. We show that politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient in segmented markets as well.
We begin our discussion of segmented markets by considering the monopolist￿ s pricing problem. When
markets are segmented, the monopolist is free to select di⁄erent prices in the domestic and foreign markets,
without worrying about international arbitrage.38 Formally, when markets are segmented, the problem for
the monopolist is to choose P and P￿ to maximize pro￿t in the domestic and foreign markets:
￿(P;P￿;￿) = [P ￿ co]D(P) + [P￿ ￿ (co + ￿)]D￿(P￿);
where D(P) and D￿(P￿) are the downward-sloping domestic and foreign demand functions, respectively.
Notice that P￿ can now be set independently of P, due to the assumption of market segmentation. The
￿rst-order conditions for pro￿t maximization are:
￿P(P;P￿;￿) = [P ￿ co]D0(P) + D(P) = 0; and
￿P ￿(P;P￿;￿) = [P￿ ￿ (co + ￿)]D￿0(P￿) + D￿(P￿) = 0:
We again assume that second-order conditions are satis￿ed. With segmented markets, the domestic price set
by the monopoly exporter is independent of the policies t and t￿. On the other hand, the pro￿t-maximizing
foreign price is a function of the total tari⁄￿ and may thus be represented as P￿(￿). Under general conditions,
P￿(￿) rises with the total tari⁄. We also note that P > co and P￿(￿) > co are required by the monopoly
￿rst-order conditions.
We consider next the domestic and foreign welfare functions. We can still write domestic welfare as
[P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + [P￿ ￿ (co + ￿)]D￿(P￿) + tD￿(P￿):
Letting Pw = P￿ ￿ t￿, we may thus again represent domestic country welfare as
W(P;P￿;Pw) = [P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + [Pw ￿ co]D￿(P￿):
Foreign welfare is denoted as W￿(P￿;Pw) and once more takes the following form:
W￿(P￿;Pw) = CS￿(P￿) + [P￿ ￿ Pw]D￿(P￿):
Joint welfare is the sum of W(P;P￿;Pw) and W￿(P￿;Pw), and an important observation is that joint welfare
is again independent of the world price.
An e¢ cient or joint-welfare maximizing agreement would maximize joint welfare. We may formally
express joint welfare as
J(P;P￿) ￿ W(P;P￿;Pw) + W￿(P￿;Pw) = [P ￿ co]D(P) + CS(P) + [P￿ ￿ co]D￿(P￿) + CS￿(P￿):
38An interesting implication of this feature, ￿rst pointed out by Brander and Spencer (1984a), is that the segmented
market assumption and its implied possibility of international price discrimination in e⁄ect makes all countries ￿large￿
enough to alter foreign exporter prices with their trade policy choices. As Brander and Spencer (p. 236) put it, ￿With
price discrimination even a country that is far too small to a⁄ect world prices can in￿ uence the pro￿t-maximizing
output and price chosen by foreign producers for the domestic market.￿
39Recalling that P is independent of t and t￿ and that P￿ is a function only of the total tari⁄ ￿, we may









As before, e¢ ciency requires only that t and t￿ be chosen so that the total tari⁄ ￿ satis￿es (40).
Let us now consider the politically optimal tari⁄s. We again de￿ne the politically optimal tari⁄s as
the tari⁄s that the domestic and foreign governments would choose unilaterally if they did not value the
pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements induced by their unilateral
tari⁄ choices. Speci￿cally, we suppose that the domestic government acts as if WP w ￿ 0 when choosing its
politically optimal tari⁄, while the foreign government acts as if W￿
P w ￿ 0. Recalling once again that P is










We may now immediately con￿rm from (41) that politically optimal tari⁄s satisfy the e¢ ciency conditions
in (40). We conclude that politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient.
It is interesting to consider the form that politically optimal tari⁄s take in segmented markets. The ￿rst
condition for political optimality WP ￿ dP
￿
d￿ = 0 implies [Pw ￿ co]D￿0(P￿) = 0, which could only happen if




d￿ = 0 implies P￿ = Pw. Together,
the two conditions imply that P￿ = Pw = co; thus, the political optimum amounts to a large export subsidy
from the exporting country and then free trade by the importing country. Intuitively, if governments could
be induced not to value the pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-trade movements
induced by their tari⁄ choices, they would set e¢ cient tari⁄s.39 Once again, an exactly analogous result
applies when governments have political-economic objectives.
Appendix to Section 3
Our consideration of duopoly pro￿t-shifting in Section 3 focused on integrated markets. We now assume that
the domestic and foreign markets are segmented rather than integrated. As in Section 3, the home country
has a single ￿rm, the foreign country has a single ￿rm, and the ￿rms interact as Cournot competitors. The
good is demanded in the home and foreign markets, with the respective downward sloping demand curves
again represented as D(P) and D￿(P￿). When markets are segmented, the home and foreign local prices
P and P￿ are determined by separate home and foreign market-clearing conditions. The problem of output
choice for each ￿rm is then separable across the home and foreign markets.
As shown by Brander (1981), an implication of the segmented markets setting is that in general trade
now occurs in both directions. We let t￿
h and t￿
f denote the home and foreign trade taxes on trade ￿ ows
destined for the foreign market (i.e., for exports from the home country to the foreign country, t￿
h is the
export tax imposed by the home country and t￿
f is the import tari⁄ imposed by the foreign country), and we
let th and tf denote the home and foreign trade taxes on trade ￿ ows destined for the home market (i.e., for
39The ￿nding that the politically optimal export policy is an export subsidy that pushes the world price down to
cost is equivalent to the observation that a monopolist would lower its price to cost if it did not value the pure rent
transfer to infra-marginal consumers that a price cut would imply.
40exports from the foreign country to the home country, th is the import tari⁄ imposed by the home country
and tf is the export tax imposed by the foreign country).
In the home market, the home ￿rm chooses output qh to maximize its home-market pro￿t in light of
the foreign ￿rm￿ s output choice qf for the home market. The industry output destined for the home market
Q ￿ qh + qf then determines P through the home market-clearing condition:
qh + qf = D(P): (42)
Using the home market-clearing condition (42), we may therefore de￿ne P(qh + qf) or equivalently P(Q).
Notice from (42) that, owing to the segmented-market assumption, P does not depend on trade taxes directly
but may depend indirectly on trade taxes to the extent that they alter Q.
The home ￿rm also chooses output q￿
h to maximize its foreign-market pro￿t in light of the foreign ￿rm￿ s
foreign output choice q￿
f. The industry output destined for the foreign market Q￿ ￿ q￿
h +q￿
f then determines
P￿ through the foreign market-clearing condition:
q￿
h + q￿
f = D￿(P￿): (43)
As before, we may use the foreign market-clearing condition (43) and de￿ne P￿(q￿
h + q￿
f) or equivalently
P￿(Q￿). Again, notice from (43) that under the segmented market assumption, P￿ does not depend on
trade taxes directly but may depend indirectly on trade taxes insofar as they alter Q￿.
Letting ￿￿ ￿ t￿
h + t￿
f, we may now write the home ￿rm￿ s home-and-foreign-market pro￿t as:
￿h(qh;qf;q￿
h;q￿
f;￿￿) = [P(qh + qf) ￿ co]qh + [P￿(q￿
h + q￿
f) ￿ (co + ￿￿)]q￿
h:
For each market, the home ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order condition equates the marginal revenue generated from a slight











h + P￿(Q￿)] ￿ (co + ￿￿) = 0:
Using (42) to derive dP
dQ = 1
D0(P) and using (43) to derive dP
￿
dQ￿ = 1
D￿0(P ￿), we may rewrite the ￿rst-order
conditions as
qh + [P(Q) ￿ co]D0(P(Q)) = 0; and
q￿
h + [P￿(Q￿) ￿ (co + ￿￿)]D￿0(P￿(Q￿)) = 0:
These conditions determine the home-￿rm reaction curves for the home and foreign markets, respectively.40
Given our assumption that demand functions are downward sloping, we see that the home ￿rm￿ s markups
(inclusive of trade tari⁄s) must be positive: P(Q) > co and P￿(Q￿) > co + ￿￿.




f;￿) = [P(qh + qf) ￿ (c￿





As before, in each market, the ￿rst-order condition equates the marginal revenue generated from a slight
40We assume that second-order conditions hold.
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D￿0(P ￿), we may rewrite the ￿rst-order conditions as
qf + [P(Q) ￿ (c￿
o + ￿)]D0(P(Q)) = 0; and
q￿
f + [P￿(Q￿) ￿ c￿
o]D￿0(P￿(Q￿)) = 0:
These conditions determine the foreign-￿rm reaction curves for the home and foreign markets, respectively.41
As before, we see that the foreign ￿rm￿ s markups (inclusive of trade tari⁄s) must be positive: P￿(Q￿) > c￿
o
and P(Q) > c￿
o + ￿.
For the segmented markets model, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a set of four quantity levels such that
the home and foreign ￿rms are on their respective reaction curves in each market. In the home market, we
denote the Cournot-Nash output levels for the home and foreign ￿rms as functions of the total tari⁄ that
confronts imports into the home market: qN
h (￿) and qN
f (￿), respectively. The total Cournot-Nash output
in the home market is represented as QN(￿) ￿ qN
h (￿) + qN
f (￿), and we may thus denote the corresponding
Cournot-Nash price as PN(￿) ￿ P(QN(￿)). Similarly, in the foreign market, the Cournot-Nash output
levels for the home and foreign ￿rms are functions of the total tari⁄ that confronts imports into the foreign
markets: q￿N
h (￿￿) and q￿N
f (￿￿), respectively. For the foreign market, the total Cournot-Nash output is
represented as Q￿N(￿￿) ￿ q￿N
h (￿￿) + q￿N
f (￿￿), and we may thus denote the associated Cournot-Nash price
as P￿N(￿￿) ￿ P￿(Q￿N(￿￿)).
In the home market, a higher total tari⁄ raises the marginal cost of delivery for the foreign ￿rm. We
thus expect that qN
f (￿) decreases as the total tari⁄ rises. For a broad class of demand functions (including
linear demand functions), reaction curves in the Cournot model are negatively sloped. A higher total tari⁄
then shifts in the foreign ￿rm reaction curve and thereby generates a higher level of output for the home
￿rm. In other words, we expect that qN
h (￿) increases as the total tari⁄ rises. A higher total tari⁄ thus lowers
foreign output in the home market and shifts some of this output to the home ￿rm. The overall level of
output QN(￿) is expected to fall, however, as the total tari⁄ increases. Accordingly, an increase in the total
tari⁄ leads to an increase in the price in the home market, PN(￿). Exactly analogous conditions apply in
the foreign market: an increase in the total tari⁄ ￿￿ raises the marginal cost of the home ￿rm for sales in
the foreign market and thereby lowers q￿N
h (￿￿), raises q￿N
f (￿￿), lowers Q￿N(￿￿) and raises P￿N(￿￿). In the
discussion that follows we assume that PN and P￿N rise with their corresponding total tari⁄s, although our
main results do not depend on this assumption.
We are now ready to consider the domestic welfare function. Domestic welfare is given by
[PN ￿ co]qN
h (￿) + CS(PN) + [P￿N ￿ (co + ￿￿)]q￿N
h (￿￿) + t￿
hq￿N
h (￿￿) + thqN
f (￿);
where to ease the notational burden we suppress the dependence of Nash prices on the corresponding total




f and the world price for exports to the home market by PwN(th;tf) = PN(￿)￿th.
We may also de￿ne RN(￿￿) = P￿wN(t￿
h;t￿
f) ￿ t￿
h as the price received by the home ￿rm for foreign sales,
41Again we assume that second-order conditions hold.
42and R￿N(￿) = PwN(th;tf)￿tf as the price received by the foreign ￿rm for domestic sales. Notice now that
PN ￿R￿N = ￿ and P￿N ￿RN = ￿￿. We may thus regard the Cournot-Nash quantities as functions of local
price di⁄erences. With this observation in place, we may represent domestic country welfare as
W(PN;RN;PwN;P￿N;R￿N;P￿wN) (44)
= [PN ￿ co]qN
h (PN ￿ R￿N) + CS(PN)
+[P￿wN ￿ co]q￿N
h (P￿N ￿ RN) + [PN ￿ PwN]qN
f (PN ￿ R￿N);
where in deriving (44) we also utilize the fact that the tari⁄ revenue generated from the home export tari⁄
has no e⁄ect on domestic welfare since it amounts to an internal transfer from home producer surplus.
Next consider the foreign welfare function. Foreign welfare is given by
[P￿N ￿ c￿
o]q￿N
f (￿￿) + CS￿(P￿N) + [PN ￿ (c￿
o + ￿)]qN
f (￿) + tfqN
f (￿) + t￿
fq￿N
h (￿￿);
where we again suppress the dependence of Cournot-Nash prices on tari⁄s. Proceeding as above, we can
rewrite foreign welfare as
W￿(P￿N;R￿N;P￿wN;PN;RN;PwN) (45)
= [P￿N ￿ c￿
o]q￿N
f (P￿N ￿ RN) + CS￿(P￿N)
+[PwN ￿ c￿
o]qN
f (PN ￿ R￿N) + [P￿N ￿ P￿wN]q￿N
h (P￿N ￿ RN):
The presence of segmented markets accounts for the proliferation of prices in the preceding discussion.
When markets are segmented, identical products may trade in two directions. If the con￿guration of tari⁄s
is di⁄erent along one direction of trade than the other, then the associated world prices may di⁄er as well.
Thus, we may have that PwN 6= Pw￿N. The segmentation of markets also implies that in general the
(pre-tari⁄) price that a ￿rm receives for a unit destined for export may di⁄er from the price that a ￿rm
receives when the unit is sold locally. In other words, when markets are segmented, we generally have that
RN 6= PN and R￿N 6= P￿N. Finally, we note that all local (i.e., non-world) prices depend on the associated
total tari⁄. Thus, for example, if tf were increased and th were decreased so as to keep the total tari⁄
tf +th constant, then the price received by the foreign exporter and the price paid by the domestic consumer
would be unaltered. The world price, PwN, would rise, however. This terms-of-trade change represents a
pure transfer from the home to the foreign country, as is evident from the welfare functions presented above.
An e¢ cient or joint-welfare maximizing agreement would maximize the sum of W and W￿. We note
once again that, according to (44) and (45), the world prices (PwN and P￿wN) cancel from this summation.
As just noted, world prices a⁄ect the distribution of rents across countries, but they do not directly a⁄ect
e¢ ciency. Tari⁄ policies that are motivated by terms-of-trade e⁄ects thus lead to ine¢ cient outcomes. To
explore whether any other sources of ine¢ ciency are present, we express joint welfare as
J(PN;RN;P￿N;R￿N) ￿ W(PN;RN;PwN;P￿N;R￿N;P￿wN) + W￿(P￿N;R￿N;P￿wN;PN;RN;PwN)
= [PN ￿ co]qN
h (PN ￿ R￿N) + CS(PN) + [P￿N ￿ co]q￿N
h (P￿N ￿ RN) +
[PN ￿ c￿
o]qN
f (PN ￿ R￿N) + [P￿N ￿ c￿
o]q￿N
f (P￿N ￿ RN) + CS￿(P￿N):
Joint welfare can again be understood as capturing consumer surplus in each country as well as true producer
surplus for each ￿rm on units sold locally as well as those sold abroad.
We consider next the conditions that characterize an e¢ cient set of trade policies. Recalling that PN and
43R￿N are independent of t￿
h and t￿
f while P￿N and RN are independent of th and tf, and using d￿





h = 1 = d￿
￿
dt￿
f , we can express the conditions that de￿ne e¢ cient choices of th, t￿




























Any combination of th, t￿
h, tf and t￿
f that implies tari⁄ sums ￿ and ￿￿ satisfying the conditions in (46) are
e¢ cient.
Once again, we de￿ne the politically optimal tari⁄s as the tari⁄s that the home and foreign government
would choose unilaterally if they did not value the pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-
of-trade movements induced by their unilateral tari⁄ choices. Speci￿cally, when choosing the politically
optimal tari⁄s, the home government acts as if WP wN ￿ 0 and WP ￿wN ￿ 0, and the foreign government acts
as if W￿
P wN ￿ 0 and W￿





























But it is now immediate from a comparison of (47) with (46) that politically optimal tari⁄s satisfy the
e¢ ciency conditions above, and are hence e¢ cient. Just as in the previous subsections, we conclude that if
governments could be induced not to value the pure international rent-shifting associated with the terms-of-
trade movements induced by their tari⁄ choices, they would set e¢ cient tari⁄s and there would be nothing
left for a trade agreement to do.
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Effect of export tariff increase in foreign market 
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